University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1987

The uses of formal and informal plans in top executive decision
making : a comparison between U.S. and Canadian executives.
Kent D. Carter
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Carter, Kent D., "The uses of formal and informal plans in top executive decision making : a comparison
between U.S. and Canadian executives." (1987). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 6046.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/6046

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE
USES OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL PLANS IN
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN EXECUTIVES

A Dissertation Presented
by
KENT D. CARTER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1987
School of Management

Copyright by Kent D. Carter 1987
All Rights Reserved

THE
USES OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL ELANS IN
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING;
A COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN EXECUTIVES

A Dissertation Presented
By
KENT D. CARTER

Approved as to style and content;

tllu-it Xcd
Professor/A. Elliott Carlisle, Chairman
/

/
/

--

Professor Geprge W. Spiro, member

Professor StanLeyLerneshow, member
/

Professor William l(i/^ooldridge, member

Professor D. Anthony Butterfield
Director, Doctoral Program
•

•

•

111

To my wife Connie, whose understanding,
thoughtfulness, and love provided
continued and immeasurable succor
during the completion of this endeavor.
And to my children Cami and Kris for all
their attempts at controlled merriment.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Numerous

individuals have contributed to the

completion of this document.

I am unable to thank

adequately all who have given their time and energies but I
do express my genuine gratitude for their guidance and
support during this past year at the University of
Massachusetts.
Elliott Carlisle has frequently given both his time
and expertise during the completion of this document.
more importantly he has provided a bit of
when the end seemed an impossibility.

I

Even

levity at times
feel privileged to

have had to the opportunity to work with and learn from Dr.
Carlisle and will always cherish his

friendship.

My committee has been extremely supportive.

George

Spiro has provided me with continuous encouragement and
assistance both in completing this work and,

more

personally,

in seeking employment

community.

Stanley Lemeshow gave me new insights

field of

in the academic
into the

statistical analysis and encouraged my timely

completion of this study.

Bill Wooldridge always

fostered

an expanded perspective and expressed genuine concern that
this

study provide value to the strategic management field.

V

Tony Butterfield,

Ph.D,

program director,

provided

invaluable assistance in developing the survey instrument
used in this

study.

Constantly available for discussion of

even the most mundane matters,
follows an "open door"

he believes

in and truly

policy.

Through both financial and unwritten means,

the

Canadian government has graciously supported me in this
endeavor.

I

sincerely appreciate their encouragement and

hope the business communities of both Canada and the United
States will

find the information contained herein useful.

My fellow students have been both supportive and
enlightening in helping me complete this project.
especially thank Ady Milman,
of normal

a great inspiration to anyone

stamina and determination;

Stephanie Newell,

was always willing to listen to tales of woe;
Koolen,

who left the

"B"

I

school

who

and Harry

to become a businessman in

a Marxist enclave.
I especially thank Ann Lankarge who has always helped
me find a way to do the impossible and survive the system.
My wife,

Connie,

and my children Cami,

and Kris,

deserve a special thank you for providing me with the
opportunity to pursue this work and for helping to inspire
confidence in my ability to accomplish this endeavor.

.FO

vii Connie has provided invaluable assistance as an editor
par excellence in the numerous revisions of this paper.

vi

My parents,

Duane and Yvonne,

and my sister,

have remained supportive throughout this

Jennifer,

"midlife crisis."

They continue to cheer my accomplishments even at this

late

date.
A special thank you to Mark Goodberlet who,
friend and a mathematician,

has

as both a

so willingly provided his

knowledgeable expertise on numerous occasions.
Finally,

my work here at the University of

Massachusetts could not have been completed without the
kindness and support of Professor Stephen Michael.
and is my mentor.

He was

His untimely death was a severe shock to

both his colleagues and me.

I miss him.

vii

ABSTRACT

THE
UUSES OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL PLANS IN
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AND CANADIAN EXECUTIVES

FEBRUARY 1987

KENT D.

CARTER, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

This

Professor A.

Elliott Carlisle

study examines the two areas of planning and

decision making at the top echelon of business
organizations.

Specifically,

it explores the influence

that the importance of the decision,
decision,

the risk of a wrong

and the uncertainty of the business environment

have on the executive's use of formal and/or informal plans
to make that decision.
how Canadian and U.S.

Additionally,

this

study explores

executives differ in their use of

formal or informal plans.

A survey was mailed to eight-

hundred U.S.

and Canadian business executives representing

firms of all

sizes across all

classifications.

standard industrial

Thirty per cent of these top level

executives responded by completing and returning the survey
instrument.
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The results

suggest that there are no significant

differences between Canadian and U.S.

executives

in either

their preference for formal or informal plans or their
rational versus
Furthermore,

intuitive decision-making style.

contrary to statements

management literature,

in the

strategic

both countries prefer using formal

plans to make important decisions and are not

influenced in

their choice by turbulence in their business environments.
As

is

suggested in the literature both U.S.

executives

in this

and Canadian

study prefer using formal plans to make

risky decisions.
Despite an apparent popular corporate trend away from
formal planning systems,

these surveyed executives

find

such plans useful and do not generally rely on intuitive,
informal plans

in making major corporate related decisions.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This

study examines the two areas of planning and

decision making at the highest echelon of business
organizations.

Specifically,

it explores the influence

that the importance of the decision,
decision,

the risk of a wrong

the necessity to "buy time",

and the uncertainty

of the business environment have on the executive's use of
formal and informal plans to make that decision.
Additionally,

this

study explores how Canadian and U.S.

executives differ in their use of formal or informal plans.

Overview

The field of

strategic management

lacks statistical

evidence to document the corporate decision-making process.
Andrews

(1980),

Ansoff

Lorange & Vancil
Strickland
Mintzberg
(1977)

(1977),

(1981),
(1973),

(1965),

Hofer & Schendel

Steiner

(1979),

Braybrooke & Lindblom
Quinn

(1980),

Wrapp

(1978),

Thompson &
(1959)

(1967),

all develop decision-making theories.

(1979),

and Nutt
They present

models and suggest research directions based on their case
studies of corporate strategic decision-making processes.

1
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However,

with few exceptions,

little quantitative research

has been used to document and clarify the observations made
by these and other theorists.

This

study builds on the

decision-making theories as well as expands the information
base of

this topic.

Background

Evidence concerning the utility of formal planning as
a method for making decisions at the higher echelons of the
organization would help solidify our knowledge related to
the value of

strategic planning systems.

findings of authors
Shrader,
(1985)

Taylor,

The recent

such as Leontiades and Tezel

and Dalton

(1984),

(1980),

and Pearce & Robinson

suggest that corporate planning has no impact on

corporate financial performance.

However,

it is not known

if the plans are actually used in decision making,

or if

they are just corporate excercises published primarily to
adorn executive office coffee tables.
merely lavish trappings,

If they are,

in fact,

then they will have no impact on

corporate financial performance as the above authors have
documented.
Other authors discuss the decision-making dichotomy
between intuitive and rational processes
Barnard,

1938;

Leavitt,

1975;

Jung,

1924;

(see in particular
Pondy,

1983;

3

Mintzberg,
1977;

1976;

Steiner,

Weick,

1969).

1983;

Hurst,

1984;

Janis & Mann,

A few of these authors suggest that

such a dichotomy is really a continuum between the two
poles of
Pondy,

intuitive and rational thinking

1983;

Quinn,

in the realm of

1980).

(Mintzberg,

Similar dichotomies are noted

strategic

planning suggesting that plans

can also be developed along a line between two points
in particular Thune and House,
Fox,

1981;

and Steiner,

1970;

1979).

Fulmer and Rue,

(see
1974;

Although the terminology

varies extensively within the literature,
are usually labelled formal and informal.
previously researchers

1978;

these two points
As noted

in the planning field have studied

such issues as formal planning and positive corporate
financial performance
and House,
1984;

1970;

(Armstrong,

Herold,

Wood and LaForge,

Ringbakk,

1971),

1971;
1979;

1978;

Dror,

Shrader,

1980;

Taylor,

Fulmer and Rue,

1980;

Thune

and Dalton,

1974;

Lorange,

1980;

Rhenman,

1972),

(Brown,

1980),

Kallmann and

formal planning and business

(Litschert and Nicholson,

strategic decision-making
Leontiades and Tezel,

1974;

1971),

environment stability
Lindsay and Rue,

Kudla,

formal planning and corporate size

(Litschert and Nicholson,
Shapiro,

1982;

1974;

formal planning and

1974;

Eliasson,

1976;

the integration of planning

into the corporate operations as it relates to corporate
performance

(Malik and Karger,

1975),

formal planning and
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implementation

(Henry,

1977),

and formal planning and

informal planning as a pendular development
Vancil,

(Lorange and

1 977 ) .

This

study attempts what none of the above mentioned

major research studies have done -

it builds on present

theory by pulling together the two areas of planning
(formal and informal)

and decision-making.

Additionally,

the study emphasizes the decision-making process.
exemplified by the corporate top executive,
(1966),

Donaldson and Lorsch

(1983),

As

as Drucker

and Kotter

(1982),

suggest it is the chief executive officer who makes the
final decisions.

Problem Statement

Several authors
McCall and Kaplan,

(Kotter,

1985)

1982;

Mintzberg,

1973;

and

have discovered in their research

that planning in a business organization appears to be very
unsystematic,
executive,

and,

likewise,

decision-making,

to be rather haphazard,

unrelated to the formal plans.

disjointed,

by the top
and

Other authors point out

that informal plans are more useful than formal plans for
executive decision-making when the problem,

opportunity,

crisis at hand is perceived to be important

(Eliasson,

or

5

1976),

when there is a need to adopt an extended time frame

for choosing a decision option
Quinn,

1980),

turbulent

(Mintzberg,

et al.,

1975;

when the business environment is very

(Armstrong,

1982),

or when the problem is not

very risky to the firms ultimate survival

(Armstrong,

1982).
Lipset

(1985)

notes that numerous authors concerned

with Canadian culture suggest that Canadian business people
have a more conservative,

traditional,

and elitist approach

to life than their colleagues

in the United States.

recent study by Milman

reveals eleven variables that

(1986)

account for the difference between U.S.
executive perceptions.

and Canadian

The most prominent differences are

the smaller Canadian domestic market size,
industrial

A

a Canadian

structure that is more elitist in function,

organizational
competitors,

size that is

1/16

that of

an

its U.S.

and a management philosophy that favors low

risk approaches to business practice.

Frederick

(1983)

has

suggested that Canadian executives are at least five to ten
years behind their U.S.
use of formal planning.

colleagues
U.S.

in the development and

top executives are believed

to be moving away from formal planning and returning to
more relaxed,
(1983),

Lipset

informal planning methods.
(1985),

and Milman

academic observers of the business

(1986)

If Frederick
and informal non

scene are correct,

then

6

Canadian executives may well expected to favor formal
planning methods
U.S.

in corporate decision making as did the

executives of

five years ago.

Each of the aforementioned formal or informal planning
issues

is based on theoretical discussions which have not

been statistically evaluated.

By quantitatively testing

these and related issues,

study broadens our

this

understanding of corporate decision-making specifically as
it relates to the use of formal and

informal plans.

The

primary objective is to answer the following questions:
- do corporate top executives of medium and large
firms rely on and use informal as well as formal plans in
making important corporate decisions,
- and is there any difference between Canadian and
U.S.

CEOs

in this regard.

The secondary objectives of this study are as follows:
- does the perceived importance and type of corporate
problem,

opportunity,

or crisis make a difference in the

choice of planning methods?
- does a need to "buy time" or the urgency of the
problem,

opportunity,

or crisis have a bearing on which

planning method is chosen to make decisions?
- does the stability or the volatility of the external
environment have an effect on the planning method chosen to
make important corporate decisions?

7

- does

the uncertainty and risk of choosing a correct

decision have an effect on which planning method is used to
make that decision?

Design of the Study

Freeman and Lorange

(1985:

33)

state "the direction of

current research in strategic management as

it has evolved

from the case method of business policy is that it is too
'squishy'.

There are too many concepts and there is too

little empirical evidence that supports the concepts."
Some authors

suggest that the research method of choice

should vary with the question of
1983;

Campbell and Stanley,

interest

1963).

(Fredrickson,

Since much of the

research concerning the corporate decision making process
follows the "squishy" methods of qualitative ethnography,
this study takes a quantitative approach followed by a
qualitative method for validating the results.

The

population from which the sample is drawn consists of
large,

medium,

and small

sized firms.

In this

study,

size

is determined by the number of full time employees
(Galbraith,

1974;

OECD,

1979).

Earlier research notes

differences

in planning by industry type

(Litschert and

Nicholson,

1974;

Karger and Malik,

1975;

Kudla,

1980;

Thune

and House,

1970;

Wood and LaForge,

1981;

Fulmer and Rue,
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1973).

This

differences

study attempts

among and between U.S.

by appropriate
Data
through

on

the

statistical

about

use

the

of

the

A
as

methodology

section of

developed

and

related

related

to

modifications
instrument
was

final

The

in a

survey

found

and

in the

The questionnaire
reviewing
of

instrument.

reviewed and

interest,
A panel

critiqued

of

the

suggested critical

initially

chief

planning"
survey

revised questionnaire
interview format

executive officers.

instrument

is

used

to a

The

in a mailing

and Canadian executives.

The dependent variables

the

can be

process via

semi-structured

corporate

to eight hundred U.S.

within

study,

document.

revised questionnaire

"formal

through questionnaire

both regarding question wording and

format.

five

been

information

developing hypotheses

researchers

administered

group of

this

five-part

closed-answer questions

There has

that debate and a discussion of

this

research,

gathered

strategic management

through a deductive

constructing a

seven academic

field of

summary of

is

questionnaire.

thinking obtained

its merits,

prior,

techniques.

a mailed

in

these

and Canadian companies

reliability and validity of

executive

instruments.

was

for

top executive decision-making

extensive debate
concerning

to control

"informal

are each aggregates
instrument.

The

planning"
of

several

and
questions

independent variables

9

problem importance,
decisions,

problem urgency,

delaying permanent

business environment stability,

and level of

decision riskiness have been developed into hypotheses to
be been tested against the dependent variables.
Nonparametric statistical analysis is used to test these
hypotheses

(see the methodology section of this document

for further information).

A comparison will be made

between U.S.

and Canadian decision-making methods with such

variables as

industry type and organizational

size being

statistically controlled.
Once the survey data is analyzed,

follow-up interviews

are conducted with a random sample of these eight hundred
I

executives.
qualitative

This coupling of both quantitative and
(within the financial constraints of the study)

research methods helps substantiate and validate
generalization from the information.

Contributions of the Research

The value of this

study lies in its

intent to provide

further documentation of how corporate executives do their
jobs.

As Kotter

(1982)

informal decisions
process that is

notes,

CEOs make formal and

"both consciously and unconsciously in a

largely internal to their minds."

The need

to know how their minds work and what methodology they use

10

is directly related to today's management education.

There

is currently a general feeling that in the area of decision
making business academics emphasize formal analytical tools
and all but ignore the use of intuitive and informal tools.
This study will help both scholars and practitioners to
understand better the uses of formal and informal plans.
Scholars will have documented evidence of what processes
are being used for setting corporate directions, and
practitioners information about how planning processes can
be tailor-made to fit the present decision situation.

Limitations of the Research

Executive interviews are subject to pervasive personal
biases, and observational case studies cannot isolate and
control for all causal factors.

One, therefore,

is

uncertain if the results are due to self-selection,
biases of the observer,

the

the skills of the executive, or a

host of other confounding influences.

However, a joint

interview-survey methodology substantiated through
extensive non-respondent evaluations certainly reduces the
impact such influences have had on this study.
Several approaches are taken in an effort to
substantiate the findings herein described.

Not only are

non-respondents thoroughly reviewed, but also random

sampling techniques are used to select both the initial
eight hundred questionnaire receivers and the executives to
be personally interviewed.

In spite of the efforts used to

validate the questionnaire and verify its reliability, no
research program can completely satisfy the triad of
"success goals" labelled "simple",
"hard" evidence.

"generalizable", and

It is impossible to control for all

confounding variables.
The intention of this study is to advance the
knowledge of the methods corporate executives use in making
corporate decisions when the environmental changes are
volatile,

the situation is important,

the need to buy time

is prevalent, and the risks of failure are great.

However,

no simple causal statements concerning these issues can be
made without conducting other confirmatory research on the
population as a whole.

Overview of Subsequent Chapters

The rest of this document is divided into six
sections.

Chapter II discusses extensively the pertinent

theory and literature material related
corporate decision-making,
planning,

to the fields of

formal and informal strategic

the corporate chief executive, and Canadian -

U.S. comparative management studies.

Chapter III

further

12

develops the research theorems, hypotheses and the relevant
research methodology used in this study.

Chapter IV

presents the results of the data analysis of the
questionnaire instrument used in this study and provides a
discussion of those results.

Chapter V contains a summary

and conclusion section which provides a synopsis of the
value of this research.

The bibliography and appendix

display information that allow this study to be replicated
and/or expanded by future researchers.

CHAPTER

II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review chapter has four interrelated
parts.

The first part reviews the process of corporate

decision making in the upper echelons of the business
organization.
field of

The second part carefully scrutinizes the

strategic planning as a method for making

corporate decisions.

The third part examines the role of

the corporate top executive especially as it relates to the
use of formal or informal plans for decision making.

Part

four provides a synthesis of the literature that compares
U.S.

and Canadian executives on the basis of their

decision-making methods.

While each of these sections

stands alone as a separate literature review of the
designated subject area,

the intent is to link each topical

part to each of the other parts and thereby develop the
foundation upon which this

study is built.

A summary

section at the end of this chapter reiterates the
relationships among these topics.
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Corporate Executive Decision-making

Decision-Making Research
The decision making methods of interest to this study
primarily involve descriptions of how individual top
executives process

information to make a final decision.

In this type of research there are three main streams of
analysis:
1.

model-fitting studies

2.

process-tracing studies

3.

cognitive-decisional style studies.

The descriptive method of

studying organizational decision

making focuses on the middle or lower level manager
1981;

Aguilar,

1982;

Grinyer and Spender,

et.al.,

1975,

1967;

etc.),

Bourgeois,

1980;

1979;

Fox and Montcalm,

Hussey,

1974;

Mintzberg,

usually uses questionnaire and

observational methods to gather data,
concerned with process-tracing
these studies

(Allan,

and is primarily

(see Table 1).

A review of

suggests that while many authors specify

upper level management as their target audience very few
actually focus on the CEO.

Researchers to date tend to

group corporate executives,

from vice president up,

together in a common domain.
books

(Bennis & Nanus,

Geneen and Moscow,

1985;

1984;

Even the recent best seller
Donaldson & Lorsch,

lacocca

1983;

15

TABLE 1
Descriptive Studies of Managerial Decision-Making
Study:

Author & Date

Carlson,

1951

Mintzberg,

N

Method of
Analysis

10

observation

CEO

5

observation

CEO

1971

Cohen, March,
Olsen, 1972

Level of
Managers

and

Cohen & March,

NA
1974

42

NA
observation

NA
college
presidents

107

questionnaire

MBA* s

Peters, Hammond
Summers, 1974

NA

lab experiment

NA

Mihalasky,

1975

36

lab experiment

CEO's

Mintzberg,
1 975*

et.al.

25

questionnaire/
interviews

middle/
upper

16

observation/
diary

upper to
lower

Horvath and
McMillan, 1979*

NA

interviews

middle

Mihalasky and
Dean, 1979

NA

Lyles and
Mitroff, 1980

33

questionnaire/
interviews

upper/
middle

Fahey,

1981

30

questionnaire

upper

Jones,

1982

200

questionnaire

upper

Shrivastava and
Grant, 1982*

61

questionnaire

middle

Donaldson and
Lorsch, 1983

12

interview/

McKenney & Keen,

Stewart,

1976

1974

lab experiment

upper

CEO
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Study:

Author & Date

Frederickson,

Hambrick and
Mason, 1984
Nutt,

1984

McCall and
Kaplan, 1985*

*

1984

N

Method of
Analysis

Level of
Managers

1 52

questionnaire

middle/
upper

NA

questionnaire

upper

interviews

middle/
upper

questionnaire

middle

312

40

= "process tracing" studies
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and Novak,

1984;

Levinson and Rosenthal,

1984)

attempting

to analyze the corporate chief executive officer do not
develop extensive empirical research.

Few of these or

other works carefully study the cognitive style and
decision making process of the top executive or attempt to
adapt a decision-making model
process used by CEOs.

(see Exhibit 1)

If one assumes the top executive is

the primary authority in the organization
boardroom),

to the actual

(outside the

then to understand how important corporate

decisions are made one must examine that single
individual*s decision-making methods.
As mentioned earlier,

the majority of these

descriptive studies use questionnaire methods of data
collection.

Some researchers comment on the severe

difficulty of validating data obtained in this manner
in particular Lyles and Mitroff,
(1975,

p.

250)

1980).

Mintzberg,

(see

et.al.

note that "tapping the memories of the

decision maker can introduce two forms of error-distortion
(deliberate or unconscious)

and memory failure."

The

actual decision process may remain in the CEO's head and
may not be obtained by truly objective means.

More recent

research

Hogarth &

(see Frederickson,

Makridakis,

1981;

Nutt,

1984;

1984)

Halal,

1984;

attempts to use either more

robust statistical methodology or more extensive in depth
information gathering techniques.

Whether the quantitative

Exhibit 1

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
(A Process Model)

approach or the qualitative approach is more valuable is
not the significant question.

What

meaningful

trustworthy information that advances

is

knowledge.

Perhaps

a combination of both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies will be the most beneficial to this
advancement

(Jick,

1979).

Definitions

Much of the lack of advancement in research concerning
informal and formal planning as decision making methods is
due to a never-ending struggle to reinvent definitions
(Camerer,

1985;

Schendel and Hofer,

1979;

Bower,

1970).

Before the informal versus formal decision making modes are
examined,

clarification of some important related terms

necessary.

"Problems"

is

can be defined as the discrepancies

found in comparing an existing state of affairs against
some standard or desired state or as the evaluation of end
results against goals
Mintzberg,
of

et al.,

searching,

(MacCrimmon and Taylor,

1975).

finding,

"Problem solving"

analyzing,

1976 and
is the process

and creating.

It can be

defined as finding or developing a solution

(DeLuca and

Stumpf,

Problem

1981

and Mintzberg,

et al.,

1975).

structure depends upon how familiar the problem solver is
with the initial

state when the problem is noted,

the
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desired state at conclusion,

and how the problem is

transformed from one state to the next
Spender,

1979;

Taylor,

1974;

(Grinyer and

and Mintzberg,

et al.,

1975).

Ill-structured problems usually arise when the available
information is "fragmentary, ambiguous,
uncertainty"

(Grinyer and Spender,

Mazzolini

(1981)

and riddled with

1979, p.

suggests that strategic decisions are

unstructured or non-repetitive decisions.
notes

(1973, p.

471)

114),

Drucker further

that the decision choice is "rarely a

choice between right and wrong but rather a choice between
almost right and probably wrong."

Lyles and Mitroff

(1980)

find in their study that ninety percent of the problems
reported by managers are ill-defined problems.
Kaplan (1985)

McCall and

report that nearly twenty-two percent of the

daily problems handled by their surveyed managers are of
the ill-defined variety (It should be noted that the
subjects in the McCall & Kaplan studies are all middle
level managers.)

Cyert and March (1963)

focus primarily on

organizational "programmed" or structured problems.

These

types of organizational problems are usually related to
operational issues and do not

(or should not),

therefore,

normally reach the CEO level of the organization.
Mintzberg,

et.al.

(1975), define decision making as a

specific commitment to action.

A decision process is a set

of actions leading to a decision.

Unstructured refers to
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the decision process itself "for which no predetermined and
explicit set of ordered responses exists in the
organization"

(Mintzberg, et al.,

final analysis then,

1975, p.

246).

In the

the strategic decision process is

characterized by novelty, complexity, ambiguity, openendedness,

time constraints,

irrevocability, and the

futurity of present concerns.
unstructured and, as Ackoff
"messes."

Management,

The problems are highly

(1974) notes, easily termed

therefore,

is frequently the art of

making decisions about unstructured problems with
insufficient information.
McKenney and Keen (1974)

note that problem solving

includes problem finding (see also Pounds,
Livingston,
being found.

1971)

1969 and

and today more and more problems are

This seems to be because greater uncertainty

and faster communications are pushing final decisions to
higher and higher levels for quick action (Collins,

1980).

The harried executive is finding that decision analysis is
not a panacea but rather just an approach to provide help
in the decision-making process.

Drucker (1954)

states that

problem-solving decisions are routine and usually
unimportant while the important decisions,
really matter, are strategic.

those that

These "strategic" decisions

involve defining the situation, defining the appropriate
resources, and making the appropriate choice.

Because a
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strategic problem cannot be easily structured,

it is very

difficult not only to find but also to formulate (see in
particular Taylor,

1974; Mintzberg, et al.,

MacCrimmon and Taylor,
1982),

1975;

1976; and Shrivastava and Grant,

Ramaprasad and Mitroff

(1984) write

...formulating a strategic problem in different
ways can result in different solutions to
the same problem" and "an error in formulating
a strategic problem can result in solving the
wrong problem...(p. 597)
Making a problem when none exists is referred to as a "Type
III" error

(Ramaprasad and Mitroff,

1984, p.597).

The Rational Decision Making Process

Some theorists today feel problem-solving and
decision-making models are too rational in their approach.
Weick (1983)

notes:

...linear models (of decision making) have only
modest relevance to everyday thinking.
Even if
people tried to implement them, they would find
them foreign to what they are trying to do...
(p. 241).
Kunreuther (1969) argues that man is so erratic in his
actual behavior that the models of a rational decision
maker are totally useless.
It now appears that top executive decisions involve
not just the use of a step-by-step decision making
sequence, but also the use of experience, judgment, and
subjectively assigned probabilities under conditions of
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incomplete information.

The rational models are,

in most

cases, a useful description but not very practical for
everyday use at the top executive level in business
organizations•
One of the intents of the decision-making models
espoused in the strategic management literature is to help
the executive make good decisions.

It was suggested

earlier that the CEO in the firm deals primarily with
complex, unstructured problems.
important

(strategic)

(Mazzolini,

1981)

Efforts to solve these

problems must be herculean

in order for the firm to survive.

The

generally recommended framework is to formulate the
problem, gather the facts, generate and identify the
alternatives,
optimal choice
et.al.,

1975;

evaluate each alternative, and make the
(Bower,
Schrenk,

1970; Drucker,
1969;

Simon,

1954; Mintzberg,

1957; Witte,

1972)

(see

Exhibit 1, page 18).
Shrivastava and Grant (1982)

suggest that decisions

made using the above or similar models have certain
characteristics.

They require the expenditure of large

amounts of resources, have an impact on the entire
organization, are influenced by the external environment,
and,

as noted earlier, are novel and complex.

Drucker

(1973), on the other hand, notes that Japanese executives
make decisions using quite a different process.

Drucker
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explains

this

difference as

follows;

...In the West, all the emphasis is on the
answer to the question.
Indeed, our
books on decision-making try to develop
systematic approaches to giving an answer.
To the Japanese, however, the important
element in decision-making is defining
the question.
The answer to the question
(what the West considers the decision)
follows from its definition."
(p. 467-68)

In
models

spite of
of

clearly and precisely developed

decision making,

world has
that

these

had

limited

researchers

their application to the real

success.

March

and academics

alike

to put our knowledge and theories
is

acceptable

in real

organizations.

If models

Simon

(1978,

p.

in
8)

the

suggests

decision making do not

seem to

is

situations

because

"in complex

considerable gap between
environment

as

the

the

problems

then the
relevance

don't

formal

real

lend

for

themselves

fail,

as

declared

as

and test

then one must

there

is

is

find out

We

and

of

The

in the models,

the

can never

to explicit

1974).

of

occurrences

as we enact

is

them

likely to be a

environment
it."

it

they tend to do

the reason models

decision making model

(McKenney and Keen,

making process,

it

out

He believes

represent actual

actor perceives

truely know the environment
the

to work.

field,

points

should not be ashamed

to develop theoretical models

when they are examined
why.

(1978)

it.

If

formulation,

little

rational decision
is

suited

to
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solving programmed and cleanly structured problems but not
the ill-structured problems confronted at the higher
echelons of the corporation.
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Rational Versus

Mintzberg
strategic,

Intuitive Deci

(1982,

p.

281)

Making Processes

notes that organizational,

decision making "appears to be largely

intuitive" anyway.

"A handful of scientists and academics

have come up with measurable proof that subconscious
elements play a role in the decision making process"
(Rowan,

1979,

p.

111).

The dichotomy between rational/

analytic and intuitive/judgmental decision making has been
discussed for decades but especially since the advent of
Frederick Taylor's
methodology.

(1947)

Mintzberg

so-called "scientific management’

(1973a)

says the CEO pays lip

service to systematic long-range planning,
of organizations,
he's a

'holistic',

climate.

elaborate tables

and reliance on computers,

in reality

intuitive thinker who enjoys a chaotic

Maybe this is why purely rational decision making

models seem useless when plugged into the corporate
decision making process.
just a holistic,

If the top executive is really

intuitive thinker who cares

formal planning process,

little for the

then perhaps the formal planning

process is a waste of corporate resources.

The most likely

case is one in which the executive relies on the formal
planning process to deepen his/her knowledge and experience
base for storage in the brain's archives where it remains
readily accessible to that individual's subconscious
intuiting process.
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Some theorists

suggest that each individual carries a

distinct personality type with a predisposition toward
either the rational or the intuitive decision-making modes.
McKenney and Keen

(1974)

note:

...perceptive individuals focus on relationships
between items and look for deviations from or
conformities with their expectations (intuitive
decision making).
Receptive thinkers focus on
detail rather than relationships and try to
derive the attributes of the information from
direct examination (rational decision making)...
(p. 80).
They also suggest that these two modes of thinking relate
more to human propensity than to human capacity to deal
with problems.

Mason and Mitroff

(1973)

note a thinking

individual relies primarily on cognitive processes,
he/she evaluates
judgments.

situations by using abstract true/false

The intuitive person,

however,

evaluate situations along personal

lines

pleasant/unpleasant and like/dislike).

good thinking processes

(Fox,

tends to

(e.g.

good/bad,

He/she is apt to

see analytical tools as a supplement to,
for,

and

not a substitute

1981).

Early comparisons of these two decision making modes
are provided by Charles Lindblom
Lindblom's

seminal work,

(1959).

Chester Barnard

However,
(1938)

before

spent

considerable effort noting the value of intuiting in
business organizations.

Remembering that Barnard's

writings take place during the national

love affair with
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"scientific management"

(Taylor,

1947),

it is all the more

extraordinary that he places his primary emphasis on
informal decision making.
322)

Barnard writes

(1938,

p.

301-

that logical reasoning processes are increasingly

necessary but are of

lower order value to the executive and

must be subordinated to highly developed intuitional
processes.
Lindblom provides
process.

intuitive decision making with a

He writes that decisions are not definitive

because problems themselves are continually changing.
believes decision making is a process of

"successive

approximations to some desired objectives"
and those objectives,
reconsideration.

themselves,

also the desired ends.
by a process of

(1959,

p.

86)

continue to change under

What Lindblom suggests

only the problem that is

He

is that it is not

ill-structured and nebulous but
Therefore,

the executive proceeds

"successive limited comparisons."

He

further suggests that the experience based CEO can make
good decisions without relying on a rational-scientific
process.
Other authors
Wrapp

(1967)

since Lindblom agrees with his

ideas.

even suggests that executives never really

make major policy decisions.

Quinn

(1980)

notes that

process described by Lindblom and Wrapp is a "logical
incrementalism" approach.

Quinn attempts to give the

29

intuitive decision making process a more rationalistic
flavor.

Blackburn

(1971)

would agree with Quinn that the

intuitive process can become more rationalistic with
appropriate training.

Pondy

(1983)

and Mintzberg

(1973)

suggest that there are really three rather than two modes
of decision making:
(union)

rational,

intuitive,

and a combination

of these two.

Intuitive decision making seems to be subconscious or
preconscious.

Issack

(1978)

says

"sudden insights of

intuition are evidence of unconscious work below the level
of the rational mind".

This preconscious process of

intuitive decision making is perhaps why both Hotter
(1982b)

and McCall,

managers

Kaplan and Gerlach

(1982)

note that

seem to act thoughtfully but spend no time

thinking.

Weick

(1983)

provides three plausible

explanations for the observation that managers don't think:
1.

Managers do think,

but not while on the job.

2.

Managers are so good at what they do they don't
need to think.

3.

Managers think all the time but researchers have
missed it.

If

intuitive decision making takes place at the

subconscious
Hotter,

1982,

level of the human thought processes
p.

161),

(see

then the researcher is very likely

to miss that activity totally.

There will be few outward
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signs of

"intuiting" but rather what appears to be just a

"shoot from the hip" decision termination.
p.

21)

suggests these surprise insights

Bruner

(1979,

"grow" out of

"combinatorial activity" or placing things

in a new

prespective through the slow accretion of knowledge.

A

process that is not easily noticed through surface
observations.

The Intuiting Process

There are numerous citations of the uses of intuitive
decision making.

Kraft

(1980)

discusses how General Motors

Corporation used a combination intuitive and rational
decision making process
line

in deciding to downsize their car

(even if the decision was late).

Long

(1982)

provides

an enlightening review of how one man used "gut feelings"
in managing Coke's
describes

foreign financial markets.

the linkage of

Hurst

(1984)

"hard box" and "soft bubble"

decision making in the turn-around of a major corporate
division in Canada.

Although the rational decision-making

models may not be appropriate at the upper echelons of the
organization,

this does not mean the rational process

without value.

As Hurst

model isn't wrong;
decision making)
the words,

(1984,

p.

79)

notes,

it just isn't enough."

is

"The rational

Logic

(rational

really only plays a role when arranging

the parsed chunks,

the ideas after the
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conclusions have already been reached
1977).

(Saaty,

When humans make final decisions,

preferences,

persuasion,

gut feelings,

1980;

personal

and emotion prevail

over a clear and concise logic or rationality.
rational,

analytical,

Weick,

However,

factual presentations will have

persuasive impact on the final outcome of any
organizational decision process.
The fields of psychology and phenomenology delve
deeply into the study of the human mind and its functioning
as

it relates to human decision-making processes.

Those

efforts have lead to the development of a large field of
study devoted totally to understanding the human mind in
its decision-making capacity.

This

field is

sometimes

referred to as part of the decision sciences.
Simon

(1960)

in this area.

Herbert

is perhaps the best known of the researchers
The decision sciences and related

psychological approaches to studying decision-making and
cognition take more of a theoretical approach in their
study than is the intent of this research.
fields of

While these

inquiry add much to our understanding of the

decision-making process very little study evolves around
how top business executives actually make their important
corporate decisions.

Therefore,

this study does not

attempt to analyze directly such psychological attributes
as perceptual ability,

information capacity,

risk-taking
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propensity,

and aspiration levels as they relate to human

decision-making but does,

instead,

analyze the processes

external to the executive's mind.
A review of the commonly used decision-making terms
suggests three major categories of similar research
approaches

(see Table 2).

The first major grouping is that

of cognitive versus affective
1938;

Hurst,

1975;

Mintzberg,

1984;

Saaty,

executive,

1984;

Jung,

1982;

1980;

(see in particular Barnard,

1924;

Myers,

Leavitt,
1962;

1975;

Ramaprasad and Mitroff,

Taggart and Robey,

1981).

in the view of these authors,

with intellectual,
with intuiting,

reasoning,

soft,

of decision making processes.
non-rational,

thinking,

personal,

Mihalasky,

The rational

is more concerned
and sensing than

subjective,

feeling types

They emphasize,

however,

emotional human being in their writings.

the
A

second grouping of authors places emphasis on human brain
activity and how people decipher,
and use data
1982;

store,

(see in particular Blackburn,

Greiner,

Mintzberg,

recode,

Leitch and Barnes,

1976;

Smith,

1978;

1970;

Weick,

1971;

Lindblom,

1983).

recall,
Camillus,
1959;

Their primary

interest is understanding how human beings come to use one
method over another and whether or not there are
physiological reasons
approach).

for these differences

(a scientific

A third group is concerned with how the

rational approach can be contrasted to a political view of
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man's attempt at making decisions
(those of note include Fahey,
McMillan,

1979).

in large organizations

1981;

Halah,

1984;

Hovath and

Other approaches to the dichotomy problem

found in eastern versus western philospohies

(Yang and

Yin);

Fox,

Pondy,

1983

(an incremental approach);

(confirmatory versus conceiving);
(unimportant versus

important);

Eliasson,

1981

1976

Janis and Mann,

1977

(a

psychological approach).
What is apparent from the above review is that the
desire to discuss and analyze the rational/intuitive
dichotomy cuts across all fields of social science inquiry.
From the humanisitic to the scientific,
to the philosophical,
phenomenological,

from the political

from the behavioral to the

numerous theorists of differing

persuasions are interested in the topic,

and all have a

favored means of defining the other side of rational.
Ferber

(1967,

rational

p.

B-520)

even prefers to divide the term

into the two components of rational decisions and

rationalized decisions
analysis).

(another form of psychological

A realization that the rational-intuitive

decision making processes are involved in all aspects of
human endeavor cannot be ignored.
The view of intuitive decision making provided by the
above discussion is one of chaos and ambiguity.

It seems

reasonable to suspect that when the corporate president
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TABLE 2
THE INFORMAL - FORMAL DICHOTOMY
A LIST OF TERMINOLOGY

Author:

Date

Rational View

Intuitive View

Taggart & Pondy
logical-rational
mysterious/intuitive
(1981)
cognitive/analytic affective/unsystematic
Barnard
(1938)

logical-reasoning
subordinate

Leavitt
(1975)

analytic

Mintzberg
(1976)

Sensation-Thinker
conscious

Eastern
Philosophy

Yang

Hovath & McMillan
(1979)

Camillus
(1982)

Author:

wisdom/feelings

left hemisphere
right hemisphere
logical, linear
holistic, relational
visual comprehension
language, accountants
planners, lawyers
emotions, gestures
explicit, verbal,
artists, sculptors
argument, intellectual
politicians, implicit
spatial, gestalt,
"formal planning"
"informal planning"

Jung
(1924)

Pondy
(1983)

non-logical/aesthetic
superior

Yin

rational,
analytical
objective

behavioral,
political
phenomenological

comprehensive
synoptic

Logical Incrementalism
(bounded rationality)

rational = analytical
sequential, convergent
detailed, logical,
scientific, digital
Date

Intuitive-Feeling
unconscious

Rational View

intuitive = synthetic,
simultaneous, divergent
holistic, artistic,
patterns, analogue
Intuitive View
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Author: Date

Rational View

Ramaprasad &
Mitroff (1984)

Myers

thinking: logical
impersonal,
objective

(1962)

Sensing-thinking

Luca and Stumpf
(1981 )

problem-solving
convergent

Frederickson
(1984)

comprehensive

Intuitive View

feeling: value-laden
personal,
subjective
Intuiting-feeling
decision-making
divergent
non-comprehensive

Mintzberg
(1982)

hard, 5 senses
front-end selection

soft, 6th sense
back-end selection

Ohmae
(1982)

rational, by-thenumbers

natural,

McKenney & Keen,
(1974)
Lindblom
(1 959)

Blackburn
(1971 )

Weick
(1983)

perceptive,
intuitive

receptive,
systematic

"the root method"
ground-up

Greiner, Leitch,
Barnes (1970)

Cyril Smith
(1978)

conceiving,
experience

confirmatory,
quantitative

Fox (1981)

trained

constituted facts

sequential

"the branch method"
add-on
subjective,
intuition

objective,
intellect
educated

linear,

instinctive

imaginative

non-logical, right-brain
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Author: Date

Rational View

Hurst
(1984)

hard box: static,
clarity, context
fact, science, written
know, control,
solve, sequential,
conscious, learn,
knowledge, full,
description, lens.

Toda
(1980)

analytical,

Saaty
(1 980)

rational,

Mihalasky
(1975)

Eliasson
(1976)
Fahey
(1981 )
Halal
(1984)
Mintzberg
(1975)

logic, plays

cognitive, numbers

Mintzberg &
Waters (1983)
Dror
(1975)

rational

formal detailed
plan, rigid

explicit, analytic

unimportant decisions

analytical/intellectual

systematic,

formal

reflective

Intuitive View

soft-bubble: fluid
ambiguity, process
perception, art, oral
feel, influence,
dissolve, lateral,
unconscious, remember
remember, wisdom,
parable, mirror.
predictions,

sense

feelings, experience

pre-cognition, guesses

personal vision.
flexible
spontaneous,

intuitive

important decisions

behavioral/political

ad hoc,

informal

discontinuous, doers

Janis &
conscious, objective
Mann (1977)

subconscious, personal

Ferber
(1967)

rationalized decisions

rational decisions
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must deal with ambiguous problems s/he may resort to and
rely more heavily upon intuitive decision-making processes.
In an effort to articulate this process,

referred to as

"organized anarchy", Cohen, March and Olsen (1972)
the "Garbage Can Model."
in which problems,

suggest

"The garbage can process is one

solutions, and participants move from

one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the
nature of the choice,

the time it takes, and the problems

it solves all depend on a relatively complicated
intermeshing of elements"
157).

(Cohen, March and Olsen,

1972, p.

They note that the Garbage Can process or system

does not "solve" problems but does provide information so
that choices can be made.
the human mind and,

This system seems submerged in

therefore, unknowable.

Cohen, March,

and Olsen actually provide a good model of the intuitive
process.
processes.

This model can be compared to models of rational
Unfortunately,

little follow-up work has been

done in using the Garbage Can Model in such an analysis.
Mitroff and Emshoff
approach to planning

(1979)

suggest that a dialectic

(and decision making)

when dealing with what Ackoff

(1974)

is a useful tool

and Wildavsky (1973)

refer to as "messes" or highly unstructured problems.
Others disagree

(see Cosier,

1981).

Regardless of which approach the CEO prefers to use in
problem-solving,

the point is the intuitive, non-logical.
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behavioral side of decision making must be recognized and
understood.

This requires a new and vigorous effort at

documenting and examining the intuiting process through
vigorous studies

(Schwenk,

1984).

How formal, rational

decision making processes can be used to support the
manager in his/her use of intuitive decision making must be
discovered.

Planning is a formal system for determining

what future actions need to be taken (see Drucker,

1973, p.

129 & 611;

1978, p.

Steiner,

1979, p.

13-14; and Armstrong,

6), but how can the formal planning processes be linked to
the intuitive decision making process.

Ohmae (1982) notes

that the old breed of natural instinctive strategists
(executives)

are being replaced by a new breed of rational,

by-the-numbers,

strategists.

His fear is that such a

replacement will limit future business organization growth
because the creative processes within the human mind will
be stifled.

Ohmae states

(p.

4)

"successful business

strategies result not from rigorous analysis but from a
particular state of mind."

The top executive, today, most

likely uses the formal planning system as one means of
further honing his/her intuitive decision making skills.
Either reduced availability of "data-driven" information or
limitations placed on executive decision-making creativity
will greatly hamper successful corporate decision-making.
If effective management is to continue in businesses.
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researchers must help by insuring that the true and
realistic value of intuitive decision making is not only
explored but exposed to the executives themselves.

This is

not necessarily something new they haven't known, but
perhaps by legitimizing the value of such processes,

the

denial that seems to have sustained the field during these
past twenty to thirty years will be rectified.
(1978)

Issack

reviewed twenty-five popular undergraduate

management text books that were written between 1974 and
1978.

Only three acknowledge intuition and/or intuitive

decision making in any form.

Some colleagues say that

research that is immediately applicable to daily business
situations is not deep or hard enough.

Simon (1979)

says:

...it is a vulgar fallacy to suppose that
scientific inquiry can't be fundamental if
it threatens to become useful.
The real
world is perhaps the most fertile of all
sources of good research questions calling
for basic scientific inquiry... (p. 494).
The role that intuitive decision making plays in everyday
executive activity simply underscores the importance of
descriptive research

(Einhorn and Hogarth,

1982).
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Corporate Strategic Planning

The theory of planning that most closely guides this
section is that presented by deSmit and Rade (1980) who say
a theory of planning concerns planning methods, knowledge
of decision making methods,
are determined.

and processes by which policies

deSmit and Rade (1980)

continue by saying

planning can be viewed as holistic, continuous, and
anticipatory in taking and making decisions.
process embracing the preparation,

taking,

It is a

evaluating, and

implementing of a set of inter-related decisions leading to
a desired future.

This view-point is that of the

rationalistic planner, but such a process is only desirable
and meaningful if it is based on the conviction that the
top executive's decisions really have an impact on the
future.

The disadvantage of such a process is that it

reduces phenomena down to an understandable,

simplified,

coherent body of information which may or may not,
final form,

reflect reality.

and Weathersby (1983, p.
planning)

274)

in its

However, as Bartunek, Gordon,
note "no single theory (of

completely or correctly represents most

phenomena."
The formal structured planning process parallels quite
closely that of the rationalistic corporate decision making
process models discussed in the preceding section.

The
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formal planning process entails establishing objectives,
strategies, or alternative courses of action (formulate the
problem); pursuing all courses of action in a game plan or
scenario fashion (collect data and evaluate alternatives);
choosing a course of action or strategy (make a decision);
and implementing the plan (Fahey,
Mintzberg

(1978)

1981)

(see Exhibit 2).

suggests there are essentially three

different and definable corporate planning processes:
planning mode, depicting a highly ordered process;

the

the

adaptive mode, depicting a method of planning that is, at
once, both disjointed and incremental; and the
entrepreneurial mode, depicted as informal,

intuitive

planning where no formal methods are detectable in the
processes used.

Most executives will use and rely on a

combination of these processes.

Executive psychological

predisposition toward one or the other is likely but
reliance upon one method while abstaning from the other two
is a highly unlikely procedure in the successful corporate
decision maker.

Mintzberg goes on to suggest that a plan

is a strategy (1978, p.

935)

and that strategic means

important to the survival of the firm (1975, p.

246).

As

noted earlier, Drucker (1954) also defines the important
corporate problems,

that require action by the top

executive, as strategic decisions.
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Exhibit 2
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Definitions

Numerous business policy and strategy professionals
have lamented the confused and ambiguous state of the
professional language.
new,

unambiguous,

Camerer (1985, p.

specialized vocabulary.

2)

says we need a

Schendel and

Hofer (1979) urge the development of a commonality of
definitions and constructs.

In his article "The Historical

Development of the Strategic Management Concept," Bracker
(1980)

lists seventeen different, viable, and published

definitions of strategic management.

Even the continuous

debate over the label strategic management or business
policy, or business policy and strategy tends to lend
credence to the belief that no solid theoretical base for
the field has been established.

For as Simon (1946)

says

if there is no comprehensive term that covers these sub¬
purposes,

then we are not dealing with a scientifically

based subject matter.
In another related example, the terms formal and
informal planning, while certainly recognized as containing
different content, are not clearly enough defined to be
operationalized empirical observations.

No clear line of

demarcation exists between the two types of planning.
is even more ambiguous than the definitional problem
discussed earlier concerning rational versus intuitive

It
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decision making.

A review of the planning literature

attests to this point
LaForge,

1979; Herold,

Grinyer,

1980;

(Fox,

1981; Kudla,

1971; Armstrong,

Karger and Malik,

1980; Wood and
1982; Al-Bazzaz and

1975; Camillus,

1975;

Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Porter, and Radosevich,

1970;

Homer, Long, and Pecho (see Vancil, Aguilar, Howell, and
McFarlan,
1974;

1969); Kallman and Shapiro,

Shrader, Taylor and Dalton,

1978; Fulmer and Rue,

1984).

In not one of

these articles is both "formal" and "informal" planning (or
their expressed equivalents)
operationalized.

clearly defined and

Rittel and Webber (1973)

refer to these

problems in defining terms, especially as related to
"planning", as justifiable because of the nature of the
problems.
wicked"

As they note,

"planning problems are inherently

(Rittel and Webber,

1973, p.

160).

On the other side of this debate. Bower (1970, p.

637)

indicates that "refining language to talk about well
described problems is a marginal contribution."

In Bower's

view the field is clearly defined by authorities such as C.
Roland Christensen and Kenneth Andrews, while other authors
are not satisfied with these definitions.

Planning Defined

Planning, as a general business term,
numerous and varied ways.

is defined in

Steiner (1979, p.

9)

says it
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deals with "the futurity of current decisions".
(1976, p.

53)

Mintzberg

says planning means "thinking ahead."

Houlden (1980,

p.

107)

says the main purpose of planning is

"to assist a better choice between alternative strategies".
The list of definitions is long and seemingly endless.
This fact certainly lends credence to Camerer's

(1985)

contention that an ambiguous professional language is the
major problem the policy field faces today.
One point of agreement can be noted.

Each of these

afore mentioned writers discuss planning in terms of the
future.

Given this futurity concept,

synonymous with forecasting?

is planning

Armstrong (1978) attempts to

clarify this issue by noting that planning is concerned
with determining what the future should look like while
forecasting is concerned with determining what the future
will look like.
the future.

Clearly, planning discusses and envisions

The planning definition that is used in this

study is that proposed by Wildavsky (1973, p.

128)

"planning is the attempt to control the future by current
acts."
Planning Subcategories Defined

There are numerous distinctions in types of business
plans/planning processes.

Wood and LaForge

(1979)

refer to

comprehensive versus noncomprehensive plans/planning.
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Thune and House

(1970)

and Herold (1971)

versus informal plans/planning.

talk about formal

Malik and Karger (1975)

mention integrated versus nonintegrated plans/planning.
Fulmer and Rue

(1974) discuss impoverished, programmed, and

progressive plans/planning while Kudla
non-planners,

(1980)

refers to

incomplete planners, and complete planners.

Fox (1981) writes about formal versus intuitive
plans/planning.
Steiner

(1979) notes there are essentially two

fundamentally different ways for a manager to formulate
plans.

He labels the first as "the Mickey Finn approach"

or what others would call the intuitive, non-integrated, or
informal approach.

Steiner

perhaps too strongly,

(1979, p.

9)

further states,

that "if an organization is managed

by intuitive geniuses there is no need for formal strategic
planning".

By this, he means if everyone in a position of

control in the firm can accurately anticipate the future
related to the business of the organization,
no need to plan formally for that future.

then there is

Steiner feels

informal, anticipatory-intuitive planning is generally
based on the past experiences, gut feelings, judgement, and
reflective thinking of one person.

Informal planning tends

to be based on short time horizons and usually does not
result in written plans.

On the other hand formal planning

is usually characterized by group interaction,

long time
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frames,

past extrapolation data and futurist forecasts,

specific organizational
means

(not personal)

objectives,

for monitoring final planning decisions.

and a

Formal

planning is usually written.
While this dichotomy in planning/plans seems quite
distinguishable,

it is necessary to note that most business

policy and strategy authors of either empirical or
theoretical material do not define them.

The usual

approach is to define formal planning and leave the reader
with the job of specifically defining the other extreme.
Armstrong

(1982)

points out that we need "a definition to

distinguish formal from informal planning".
p.

8)

Anthony

(1965,

also notes that "a distinction should be made between

formal and informal planning systems";
offer definitions.

however,

While Karger and Malik

(1975)

characterize informal planning as short range,
1-2 year budgets,

he does not

unwritten,

and general discussion about the future

among the involved corporate members,

their definition

appears to make a division between functional or business
level plans and corporate level plans rather than planning
methods within each planning level.

They do not then

attempt empirical verification of their definition.
Jones

(1978)

finds

in his survey of corporate chief

executives that most show a great interest in whether
planning is effected on a formal or informal basis.

At the
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same time many corporate presidents

find the whole process

of planning rather unnatural and incompatible with their
normal style of decision-making
(1972,

p.

4)

(Dror,

1975).

Rhenman

even believes that the whole process of formal

planning is a waste of time stating "strategic planning is
seldom necessary".
To restate,

if decisions in the present can really

influence the future of the firm,

then the process of

planning becomes meaningful and the question of when
informal planning is more appropriate than formal planning
becomes viable.

Once an organization decides

in favor of

planning it will

lean toward formal planning processes

if

the top executive is unsure of his/her innate decision¬
making abilities.

"In a fundamental

sense,

formal

strategic planning is an effort to duplicate what goes on
in the mind of a brilliant,
1979,

p.

10).

However,

intuitive planner"

(Steiner,

another view is that formal

planning is a method for expanding and enhancing the
executives

information base.

The stored data and

experience s/he relies on in refining any final decision.
Without the formal plans the executive's internal data base
would be substantially reduced thereby adding increased
risk to any strategic,

corporate-wide decisions.

Rhenman

is overlooking the supplimental value that formal planning
provides to the top executive.
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Planning is an activity common to all business
organizations

(Camillas,

1975).

Whether this planning is

informal or formal depends on numerous organizational
factors.

In addition to the organization's members

predilection for planning or not planning,
issues of organizational size,
activities,

organizational

expectations.

organizational business

structure,

These issues

there are the

and corporate

(some would say variables)

are

not discussed here since they are thoroughly presented in
numerous journal articles
Rue,

1974;

Boulton,
Tezel,

1980;

Camillas,
1971;

Thune and House,

Franklin,

Ramanujam,

(see in particular Fulmer and

1974;

Venkatraman,

1978).

Dror,

and Camillas,

1984;

Kudla,

Litschert and Nicholson,

(1974)

1980;
1984;

and Eliasson

1975;

Leontiades and

1982;

Taylor and Dalton,
Brown

1982;

Armstrong,

Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer,

Shrader,

Malik and Karger,

Lindsay and Rue,

Lucado,

1975;

1970;

1974;

1975;
1978;

Herold,

Kurke and Aldrich,

1979;

Kallman and Shapiro,
(1976)

both indicate that

much if not most company planning and decision making is
made outside the formal planning routine.

Planning and Organizational Financial Performance

Assuming we believe in our ability to have an impact
on our future by planning now,

what kind of impact will we
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have?

Steiner

(1979) has indicated that, except for a very

few companies, those who don't use formal planning are
courting disaster.

Harold Fox (1981)

says that for every

successful company that uses informal planning there is a
company floundering for lack of a formal planning system.
Yet,

the controversy continues today over whether or not

formal planning positively affects a business
organization's financial performance.

A few of the more

descriptive studies on this question are noted in table 3.
A more complete list can be found in Armstrong (1982),
Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton (1984)
Robinson (1985).

and Pearce, Freeman, and

It seems that at this point the policy

and strategy discipline should accept the conclusions of
Hussey (1984, p.

44):

...research proves beyond a doubt that
corporate planning can be beneficial,
but does not prove it will always be
beneficial in every case... (p. 44).
Due to the large number of and the inability to
operationalize variables related to the issue of planning
and performance (such as size, corporate age, executive
age, environmental change,

technology),

it is unlikely

solid empirical evidence will ever be uncovered.
The question of value may be moot when one considers
the large number of firms that already use formal planning.
Boulton, Franklin, Lindsay, and Rue

(1982)

conducted a

rerun of the Lindsay and Rue (1980)

study of who plans and
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how.

They find that there has been a substantial increase

in the overall number of firms now conducting formal
planning.

Argenti

(1976)

finds that by the middle of the

1960*s nearly 75% of all large firms were using formal
strategic planning methods.

It appears that the emphasis

placed on planning publications and other media has given
corporate executives reason enough to invest in the
planning idea.

A logical extension of the assumption that

greater success follows rigorous planning is to assume that
superior planning systems allow a company to outperform
competitors with lesser quality systems
Tezel,

1980).

(see Leontiades and

No systematic empirical study, as yet,

attempts to answer carefully which planning systems are
best, but Bartunek, Gordon, and Weathersby (1983)
some things to look for

suggest

(decision-making participation,

diversified view points, etc.)

in judging comprehensive

programs.

33)

As Lucado (1974, p.

been a nominal conversion to the
planning".

notes "there has clearly

'dogma*

of corporate

This desire to be included in a potentially

beneficial movement has caused a stampede to formal
strategic planning.

"Most people appear to pursue

strategic planning through fear rather than enlightenment"
(Frederick,

1983, p.

40).

As the band wagon gains riders,

the true value of planning may become less important.
nearly everyone is planning,

little advantage will be

When
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TABLE 3

STRATEGIC PLANNING EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Studies finding a
significant positive
effect on performance

Armstrong,

Camillus,

Herold,

Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton,
1984

1982

Malik and Karger,

Studies finding no
significant effect on the
organizations performance

1975

Leontiades and Tezel,
Kudla,

1975

1972

Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg,
Portner, and Radosevich,
1970

1980

Kallman and Shapiro,

1978

Grinyer and Norburn,

1975

Dror,

1975

Sheehan,
Thune and House,

1970

1980

1975

Fulmer and Rue,
Ringbakk,

1971

1974
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gained by those who plan over the small number of firms who
are not planning.
positive,

As long as the planning impact is

it behooves the corporate president to play it

safe and follow the corporate wisdom of his/her
professional peers by continuing to use a formal planning
process.

Other Values of Formal Planning

Aside from the issue of financial performance a few
authors comment on the value of formal planning from a nonfinancial perspective.

Taylor

(1976, p.

27)

notes that

planning is most useful when the company faces the issues
of imminent corporate demise and at other times when
radical change is essential.
p.

173)

Homer, Long, and Pecho

(1969,

suggest that the real benefits of formal planning

are the sharing of work loads, a comprehensive approach to
corporate thinking, and a stronger ability to cope with
complex situations.

Pearce, Freeman, and Robinson (1985)

suggest several nonfinancial consequences of formal
strategic planning (obtained through a review of the
literature related to formal strategic planning):
1. enhances ability to identify strategic issues
2. allows for systematic allocation of
discretionary resources
3. provides guidance to subunit managers
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4. enhances coordination of organizational
activities
5. helps generate better strategic alternatives
6.

improves in-house communication

7. assists in developing good managerial skills
8. allows faster adaptation to opportunities and
threats
9. makes a firm more flexible and adaptable to
change.
While the non-planner may argue most of these
improvements are unnecessary in a properly managed firm,
the planner argues it can*t hurt to be sure each is
receiving adequate attention.

If one intent of formal

planning is to provide the firm and,

in particular, the CEO

with "a comprehensive approach to thinking"
and Pecho,

1969,

p.

173)

(Homer, Long,

or to enhance identifying,

analyzing, and deciding important corporate issues,

then

the value of formal planning may be highly significant.
The effect on corporate financial performance will be
indirect and at times even spurious.
(Rue and Fulmer,

1973)

However, one study

finds nonplanners outperform

planners in the service industry.

This outcome suggests

that while it may appear reasonable to plan regardless of
the financial return,

in some situations planning may be

detrimental to the firm
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The question remains, why plan?
be in many parts.

The answer seems to

Some companies feel a need to follow the

leaders so as not to take a chance on the real value of
formal planning.

Even though the evidence does not support

a significant link between formal planning and dollar
earnings or savings, perhaps the intangibles of a more
efficient and productive internal environment are valuable
enough in themselves.

Jones

(1978, p.

81) notes that

"successful planning is a journey, not a destination.

It

is the chastening process of planning which is so
valuable".

Others suggest that it is the planning process

itself that is useful and important, not the financial
results after the plans are implemented (Ringbakk,
Lorange,

1980).

The recent literature review by Pearce,

Freeman, and Robinson (1985)
possibility.

1971;

strongly suggests this last

Wildavsky (1973, p.

129)

agrees with this

reasoning saying "achievement and not the plan must be the
final arbiter of planning".

The Planning Pendulum

A phenomenon that has received little attention in the
literature is the pendulous nature of establishing a formal
strategic planning system.

It appears that as a company

gains experience with the formal system,

there is a desire
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to return to less formal methods.

One article notes that

"among our sample the cry for greater informality was
(heard from)

companies with a longer experience of

corporate planning"
Lorange and Vancil

(Al-Bazzaz and Grinyer,

1980

, p.

33).

(1977) note in their text that the

formality of planning is tightened in the early years of
the system, and becomes less formal and more loose once the
discipline of planning is widely accepted by the line
managers.

This apparent movement back and forth between

the informal and formal dichotomies of planning may be one
of the reasons numerous companies appear to be forsaking
their highly structured planning systems.

If the movement

by a majority of firms to the formal planning mode took
roughly ten years

(1964-74,

see Lucado,

1974)

and there is

now a swing away from formal planning perhaps the pendulum
has gone full arc.

While formal planning may not,

significantly enhance a firm’s financial performance, there
is some impact on its well being.

Perhaps this impact is

be the same under informal planning processes.

The field

of strategic management, until this time, has made few
attempts to test the values and uses of informal planning.

The Triad in Planning Modes

Mintzberg

(1973)

and Pondy (1983) are two of several

authors in the field propose a triad of theories related to
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strategic planning rather than a dichotomy as heretofore
depicted.

Mintzberg breaks planning into three modes - the

entrepreneurial,

the traditional, and the formal planning

approach.

(1983)

Pondy

still uses a dichotomy in his

thinking but combines the rational
intuitive

(informal)

(formal)

planner and the

planner into one other which he

contends matches the efforts of Quinn (1980).

Quinn's

approach follows Mintzberg's "traditional muddler" concept.
Some of the authors previously discussed do suggest that a
combination of both the informal and the formal systems is
necessary for corporate success.

Lorange

(1980)

says there

is no substitute for a lack of intuitive "savvy" on the
part of the manager.

Mintzberg states that

...all intuitive thinking must be translated
into the linear order of the left (side of
the brain) if it is to be articulated and
eventually used... (1976, p. 57).
Steiner (1979, p.
observations,

10)

says that limited empirical

if undertaken,

show that the two approaches

(intuitive and systematic planning)
together in many organizations.
complement one another".

are indeed meshed

They can and should

It seems that while there may be

more than two ways to "parse"

(Weick,

1977, p.

data on planning (decision making processes),

276)

the

the extremes

on that line of thinking will include intuitive/ informal
on one end and rational/formal on the other.

It is useful
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to think that this dichotomy is a fluid line between the
two extremes
size,

(a continuum),

and that time,

executive ontological beliefs,

planning maturity,

organizational

organizational

and so forth all have a weighting value

on the pendulum which causes the organization to appear to
be functioning on one side or the other or even somewhere
in the middle.
Planning itself can be viewed from at least two modes
the intuitive/informal and the rational/formal modes.
Nearly all business organizations start in the intuitive informal mode,
informal

for,

system"

"by definition,

(Anthony,

1965,

through human interaction.
certain level of growth,
company,

p.

one does not design an
8),

it is just there

Once a company reaches a

which varies with each individual

a trend toward formal planning systems is

likely.

The corporation may go too far in its initial development
of formal plans and the planning system which may then
result in a return to a more relaxed informal atmosphere.
The

likelihood of this has not been adequately examined by

the authorities

in the field.

There appears to be a movement toward an integration
of the analytical,

intellectual,

planning and the behavioral,
(see Fahey,

1981).

formal processes in

intuitive,

As Fahey notes

informal processes

(1981,

p.

unifying theme of this movement is that the

43)

"the

‘technical'

or
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'analytical'

rubric of

strategy

(planning)

formulation is

not sufficient to describe and explain the process of
strategic decision making."
necessary,

It seems formal planning is a

but not sufficient,

method for assisting in the

strategic top management decision-making processes.
If

formal planning is necessary but not sufficient,

what needs to be added?

The formal planning process is a

rational endeavor that assumes the quantiflability of data
related to the organization.

This approach must be

subjected to refinement through the inclusion of
diversified views.

Whether those views are simply other

"type III" views of

the same problem or strictly

unconscious,

intuitive,

feelings does not matter as long as

they receive a just hearing.
the end result will
than a rational one;
"complicated"

As has been noted earlier,

likely be more of an intuitive decision
but,

at least,

the process will be

enough so that a variety of theories will

have had a chance to influence the top executive.

One

process that seems to encompass a complicated decision
making methodology is that used by U.S.
Woodward and Armstrong,

1979)

supreme court

which relies on majority and

dissenting reports to arrive at a final decision.
(1984,

p.

247)

(see

notes that corporate decisions

rational or objective in the ordinary sense,

Halal

"are not
but involve a

very personal and intuitive form of thinking."

This
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difference is due primarily to their ill-structured form
(Mintzberg, et al.,

1975).

Because formal plans are very

structured and attempt to define clearly the problems with
which they intend to deal,

their use at the top in decision

making will naturally be quite limited.

They are useful

only as organizing and chunking tools, not as answer boxes
for the ill-structured problems.
One result of the uniting of formal and informal
planning systems is,

of course, a decision and hopefully a

better decision than would have been possible if only one
or the other process had been used alone.
is organizational learning.

A second result

The purpose of decision making

is not only to maintain the organization but also to
increase its vitality in the future.
entropy (March and Simon,

1958).

To develop negative

An organization will not

continue to make such forward progress unless it learns
from its past decisions.

As Friedlander (1983, p.

194)

notes "learning is the process, change is the outcome."
This change may be as simple as accepting the past
decisions as viable for use in the future or as complex as
organizational learning through individual member insights
that leads to new modes of operation.
is what Jelinek (1981)
learning to learn.

This latter process

refers to as the organization

Organizational vitality is

substantially reduced if only rational or intuitive
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processes are used.
likely.

In combination, however,

success is

A plan is only a snapshot in time, and time stands

still for no one.

That is why formal plans must be coupled

with the intuiting abilities of the top executive.
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The Role of the Top Executive in Decision Making

Before the world of the corporate executive is
discussed,

it is helpful to remember a comment by David

Lilienthal:
...Management does not really exist.
It is a word, an idea.
Like science,
like government, like engineering,
management is an abstraction.
But
managers exist.
And managers are not
abstractions; they are men (or
women).
They are human beings.
Particular and special kinds of human
beings.
Individuals with a special
function: to lead and move and bring
out the latest capabilities - and
dreams - of other human beings.
It
is important that we describe and
identify these human beings, these
managers.
This we can do only by
recognizing the nature of the demands
made upon them as leaders, the
pressures they are subjected to by
their tasks of leadership of other
men.
The managerial life is the
broadest, the most demanding, by all
odds the most comprehensive and the
most subtle of all human activities.
And the most crucial... (1967, p. 18).

Definitions

Webster's Dictionary defines chief as of the greatest
importance, highest rank, or greatest influence.
(1938, p.

215)

Barnard

suggests, but never clearly defines, that

executive means the person who does the specialized work of
maintaining the organization.

He goes on to suggest this
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means maintaining systems of cooperative effort.
(1973, p.

Mintzberg

99) defines a top manager as "in charge of the

formal organization."

Donaldson and Lorsch (1983, p.

12)

use the term "corporate manager" in referring to the senior
executives in the companies regardless of their specific
titles.
officer

They add that "typically the chief executive
(CEO)

heads this group

(of corporate managers)."

The senior executives have a variety of titles including president, vice-chairman,
financial officer, etc.

executive vice-president,

chief

However, the corporate executives

are the people who make the final decisions.
Hotter

(1982, p.

23-24)

notes that before World War I

there was only one type of general manager in the U.S.
chief executive officer.

- a

He further notes that in the past

forty years new and different kinds of general manager jobs
have emerged - the functional CEO, the multi-divisional
CEO,

the group General Manager,

Manager, and so forth.

the divisional General

In essence. Hotter suggests at

least one new layer of management has been added to the
typical business chart.

This does not mean, however,

that

the CEO or top executive position is extinct.
Drucker

(1966, p.

5)

says that the knowledge worker in

a modern organization is an "executive" if "by virtue of
his position or knowledge, he is responsible for a
contribution that materially affects the capacity of the
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organization to perform and to obtain results.
that most managers are executives,

He adds

but certainly not all.

A chief executive officer is then simply that person
who shoulders the final responsibility for maintaining the
results orientation of the corporation.

Unless

(s)he is

over-ruled by the corporation board of directors,
executive has the final
(S)he is the,

not a,

the top

say on all corporate decisions.

leader of the business entity.

What is the Ceo Job?

Mintzberg

(1973,

p.

8)

notes that much material on the

manager as a leader and on the manager as a decision-maker
has been published,

but seldom are these two areas brought

together in a comprehensive view of the top executive's
job.

As Lewis and Stewart say:
...we know more about the motives, habits,
and most intimate arcana of the primitive
peoples of New Guinea or elsewhere, than we
do of the denizens of the executive suites in
Unilever House... (1958, p. 17).

Knowledge of what the CEO is
complete thanks
Fayol

(1949)

supposed to do is extremely

to the seminal works of authors

and Barnard

(1938).

However,

such as

the base of

knowledge for understanding what the corporate president
does and how s/he does it is quite limited.
Wrapp

(1967),

Mintzberg

(1973),

Quinn

(1980)

and more
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recently Kotter
lists

(1982)

add immensely to that base.

Wrapp

five skills that the successful CEO possesses;
1 .

keeps himself

2.

saves his health and energy for important issues

3.

is

4.

provides the firm with a sense of direction

5.

effectively uses an incremental approach.

Mintzberg

informed on a wide range of issues

sensitive to organizational power struggles

(1973,

description of

p.

92-93)

adds to this list by providing a

ten top executive roles:

Interpersonal Role:

figurehead,

Informational Role:

monitor,

Decisional Role:

leader,

disseminator,

entrepreneur,

(1980,

p.

spokesman

disturbance handler,

resource allocator,

Shapira and Dunbar

liaison

90)

negotiator.

find Mintzberg's ten

roles can be regrouped into the two primary categories of
"information generation and processing" and "decision
making,"

Quinn

(1980)

top executive uses

describes how the truly effective

logical

incrementalism in his/her job of

controlling the organization.

Kotter

(1982)

states that

CEO behavior is hard to reconcile with our traditional view
of what top managers do.
not easily fit Fayol's
organizing,
McCall,

commanding,

et.al.

(1978),

Their actual daily behavior does

(1946)

five functions of planning,

coordinating,

and controlling.

provide some interesting points

about what a corporate president does based on a summary of
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the empirical
1.

studies conducted up to 1978:

CEO's

spend only 2-5% of their time on planning

activities.
2.

The major job of the CEO is

3.

CEO's

spend only 8-13% of their time making

decisions
was

to gather information.

(Mintzberg

(1973)

found 21% of CEO time

spent on decision making).

Other points that are made concerning the job of a top
executive include that
work,

(s)he performs great quantities of

prefers current issues over past or recurring issues,

and receives more information than
1981;

Hannan,

Mintzberg,

1978;

1973;

Mintzberg

Hotter,

1982;

(s)he sends

Kurke and Aldrich,

Shapira and Dunbar,

(1973)

suggests

(Allan,
1983;

1980).

the job of the top executive

is characterized by extreme brevity in his/her daily
activities.

Kurke and Aldrich

Mintzberg's original

(1983)

in a replication of

study finds this

same characteristic

but adds that the more dynamic the industrial environment
(rapidly changing)
fragmented

of the firm,

(and brief)

the more varied and

the work of the CEO.

executive in such situations prefers

The top

live action and verbal

media to subdued thinking and formal written documents.
Allan's

(1981)

study of New York City government also

confirms Mintzberg's conclusions concerning brevity of
daily activities,

the desire for verbal media,

and the
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similarity of tasks for top managers in various
organizations.

He does find a discrepancy with Mintzberg's

contention that the figurehead role is a part of the top
executive's job.

CEO Traits and Demographics

In addition to the material on the CEO job
characteristics, there is a substantial body of knowledge
on the top executive as a human being.

This information is

usually presented either as autobiographical or
biographical writings such as ^ Years At General Motors
(Sloan,

1963), Managing (Geneen and Moscow,

1984) or

lacocca; An Autobiography (lacocca and Novak,
psychological/sociological studies
1957; Homans,

1950;

Cummins,

1967).

(Whyte,
Whyte

1984) or as

1956; Argyris,
(1956) describes

the successful executive as someone who is concerned with
"getting ahead" and not just "fitting in."

He refers to

this aggressive drive as "the executive neurosis."
(1967)

adapted the T.A.T.

Cummins

(Thematic Apperception Test)

to

be used in determining the amount of aggressive
determination a potential corporate president may have.

In

essence, Cummins attempts to validate through
instrumentation the theories of Whyte.

Since then numerous

attempts have been made to categorize and refine the
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prominent traits that exemplify the successful CEO.
Leontiades

(1982, p.

58)

perhaps best summarizes the

current thinking when he characterizes the "good manager"
as "...spatial more than linear, right side

(of the brain)

more than left side, and intuitive rather than
predictable."

He feels this is so because "at the top, a

chief executive deals at the highest level of abstraction,
encompassing all the uncertainties of the companies
individual parts."
The Hotter (1982)

study of 15 CEO*s took a close look

at the common characteristics among them.
35)

Hotter (1982, p.

says "In looking at this group of people, one is at

first glance struck by the great diversity.
and short, young and old,

They are tall

conservative and liberal, mellow

and stern, northern and southern.
seem to fit into any simple mold."

They certainly so not
However, Hotter does

suggest there are twelve characteristics which are shared
by the majority:

they like power,

ambitious, are emotionally stable,

like achievement, are
are very optimistic, are

of above average intelligence, are moderately strong in
analytical abilities,
interests.
abilities,

are personable, and have very broad

Additionally, most have strong intuitive
are very knowledgeable about their business, and

have strong cooperative relationships both in-house and
externally.

Fox and Montcalm (1982) note in their survey

69

of banking top executives that the majority (70%) have
college degrees with their primary major being business
(71% of those with college degrees),

Kotter (1982)

found

all 15 of his CEO's had college degrees and most had
graduate degrees.

Some studies note that once a top

executive finds his business-industry niche, he stays put.
Top executives are not as mobile as one would expect.

All

of these patterns appear to be validated through other
studies

(see in particular Harrell,

Executive, December,

1961

and Chief

1980),

Planning and the CEO

It appears that most top executives are strongly in
favor of planning (see Steiner and Kunin,

1983; Bologna,

1980); however, as was noted in the earlier section on
decision making,

the intuitive decision process tends to

override the rational which often finds the top executive
at odds with the recommendations of the planning unit,
since one intent of the planning process is to provide a
rational approach to decision-making (see in particular
Drucker,

1973,

p.

17,

129, and 465-480).

A common

complaint of planners is that if the CEO does not spend
time in the planning process,

it will be a worthless

endeavor

Leontiades and Tezel

(see Hussey,

1984),

(1980)

conducted a study to determine if companies with superior
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planning systems

(as judged by CEOs themselves)

outperform those with lesser quality systems.

financially
Their

results indicate that companies with the best planning
systems had ^ noticeably better results to show for their
planning effort.

In fact,

the only reasonable statement

that can be made about the CEO - planning connection is
that chief executives who rate planning highly spend more
time planning

(than those who rate planning lower).

Leontiades and Tezel

(1980)

The

study suggests once again that

the only link between the CEO, planning, and company
performance is whether the CEO feels planning is important
or not.

Eastlack and McDonald

(1970)

find that CEOs of

high performance companies are more likely to consider
strategic planning a vital part of their jobs.

This study

does not attempt to say that planning equals higher
performance,

but that successful CEOs seem to favor

planning functions.

This result may be more a function of

the bandwagon effect in formal planning than of a true top
executive predilection toward planning
section for further discussion).
Warde

(1981)

(see the planning

Godiwalla, Meinhart and

find in their survey of nearly 1200 U.S. and

Canadian CEOs that some prefer an informal/intuitive
approach to decision making while others prefer a more
structured and formal approach.

Those who prefer a more

formal approach tend to rely heavily on corporate planning

71

information in making their decisions.

Perhaps the most

interesting part of this finding is that CEOs tend to align
themselves either on the pro-planning side or on the
intuitive decision side and rarely as preferring both
methods together.

Eliasson (1976)

finds in his analysis of

numerous business firms that the more important a decision
seems to be to the corporation's health and well being,

the

more the CEO relies on intuitive, judgmental decision¬
making methods.

He suggest the advantage of a planning

system is that it frees the top executive from operational
decisions

(structured problem solving)

and allows him/her

to concentrate on more important problems.

Jones'

(1978)

study seems to suggest this when he finds that the majority
of the CEOs interviewed attach more importance to the
preparation of plans than to the actual plans themselves.
Brandt seems to summarize the issue best when he says:
...By far the oldest and most common way of
making decisions on a long-term direction
is to rely on the buried experience and
judgment (intuition) of the top people,
those who ultimately call the shots...
(1981 , p. 36)
Intuition is not obsolete; and a proper strategic planning
process can hone it.
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Cross-Cultural Comparative Management

The comparative management research between the United
States and Canada is exhaustive.

However,

studies

comparing executive decision making methodologies in the
two countries are extremely limited in both number and
scope,

Javidan

(1982)

studies the formal planning systems

in both countries as they relate to the corporate chief
executive,

the planning department manager,

divisional managers.
Canadian and U,S,

and corporate

His conclusions indicate both

executives,

at all three organizational

levels are dissatisfied with the contributions
planning make to firm performance,

formal

Javidan does not find

significant differences between the executives of the two
countries on this
(1981)

issue,

Godiwalla,

conducted a survey of

United States and Canada,

1200

Meinhart,

and Warde

chief executives in the

Again no significant conclusions

between the executives of the two countries are documented.
These researchers do find that in dynamic-complex
environments

the respondent CEOs rely more on formal

planning systems

for decision making than those executives

operating in rather stable,
Dundos
U,S,

(1979)

limited-change environs,

compares the decision making techniques of

manufacturers with their subsidiaries in Canada

He
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finds

some differences

(1986)

in the parent enterprise.

Milman

studies the variation between Canadian and U.S.

executives

in their perceptions of the business and its

environment.
The general findings of

these studies supports the

contention that the Canadian business executive is more
constrained and risk-adverse in his/her daily activities
than a similarly employed individual
(1985)

and elitist than their southern neighbors.

(1986)

notes that market size may be the single most

valid reason for these differences

in business attitudes.

Other variables related to these differences
of government support
attitudes

(Blishen,

(Milman,

Jones,

1986),

Naegle,

1971),

1972),

economies of

include kind

conservative

and Porter,

psychological dependence on the U.S.
(Perry,

Lipset

suggested that Canadians are more conservative,

traditional,
Milman

in the U.S.

1968),

and its economy

scale held in check

(Galbraith,

and risk-adversity in personalities of those in

authority

(Hardin,

1974).

Recent work by Malcolm
may be rapidly changing.

(1985)

indicates these traits

He notes that

in the past ten

years Canadian bankers and businessmen have begun to push
across the border in their determination to expand their
ultimate market size.

Malcolm suggests the "old" Canadian

restraint is now giving way to aggressive business tactics
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that have accelerated Canadian control of U.S.
more than $40 billion
true,

(U.S.).

then Milman's contention,

assets to

If what Malcom suggests

is

that market size has

fostered the old Canadian attitudes,

may be more fact than

theory.
In summary the comparative management research and
literature focuses on Canadian and U.S.

executive

personalities but no studies examine how the two
populations differ

in the area of decision making.

the possibility that Canadians are,
their business activities

indeed,

in the U.S.

Given

increasing

these differences are

even more intriguing today than they were even a few years
ago

75

Summary

While the
topical parts

information contained in each of these
is voluminous,

a review suggests the areas

are both overlapping and concurrently incomplete.
theorists discuss

intuitive decision making,

Decision

but none has

attempted to define it and empirically document it.
Strategic planners say their formal plans are necessary to
corporate survival but no studies have been conducted to
determine when CEOs

find formal plans more valuable than

they find informal plans.

Numerous

studies describe the

chief executive decision-making process,

but most base

their findings on data obtained from managers below the top
level in the organization.
describes how managers

Information is available that

from other countries differ in their

approach to business activity,
how these differences

but no information describes

impact the corporate decision making

V

process.

Finally,

executive age,

numerous authors describe the impact

executive education,

corporate size,

and

r.

business environment turbulence have on the business,

but

none of these authors describes what impact these
extraneous variables have on executive choice of decision
making methods.

This research explores these issues

through appropriate research methods and perhaps.
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therefore,

brings new insights to the strategic management

field in the area of decision making and strategic
planning.

CHAPTER

III

METHODOLOGY

Origination and Theorem Development

This

study documents and analyzes the relationship of

formal and informal planning to the decision-making process
at the top echelons of American and Canadian business
organizations.

Specifically,

it investigates which of

these two decision-making tools
when the choice to be made is
the problem,

is more likely to be used

impacted by the

importance of

the risk to the corporation of a wrong choice,

the top executive's perceived need to lengthen or shorten
the time period in which the decision must be made,

and the

stability of the external environment in which the
corporation operates.

Additionally,

comparisons are made

between the Canadian and the American top executives
concerning their grouped responses to these issues.
The theories relevant to this study are described in
the preceeding literature review chapter.

In particular,

the work done by Eliasson

(1976),

Mintzberg,

(1976),

(1983),

Armstrong

Kurke and Aldrich

Dickerson and Nadeau
(1986)

(1978),

Malcolm

(1985),

et.

al.

(1982),
and Agor

guide the development of the theorems that tollers.

This chapter first elaborates
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the theorems and resulting
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hypotheses that are evaluated in this research and then
discusses

the methodology used either to verify or to

refute the contentions outlined in these theories.
The primary objective of the study is to answer the
following questions:
1•

do corporate top executives rely on and use informal as

well as formal plans

in making important corporate

decisions?
2.

is there any difference between Canadian and U.S.

executives

in this regard?

The secondary objective of this study is to determine the
extent of the validity of theorems one through four.
The following theorems,

taken from the previously

mentioned literature are used as a basis for the
hypotheses:
Theorem

:

The perceived importance of and type of
corporate problem,

opportunity,

or crisis

makes a difference in the choice of planning
method used to solve that problem.
Theorem §2i

The need to "buy time"
problem,

opportunity,

or the urgency of the
or crisis has a bearing

on which planning method is chosen to make a
decision about that problem.
Theorem #3:

The uncertainty of the external environment,
in which the firm operates,

has an effect on
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the planning method chosen to make a decision
about a corporate problem.
Theorem §4z

The risk to the firm of choosing a correct
decision has an effect on which planning
method is chosen to make that decision.

Theorem §5:

Top executives of Canadian corporations are
more likely to rely on formal plans in making
their corporate decisions than are U.S.
executives.

Operational Definitions

For the purposes of this research the concepts of
strategic,

important,

decision-making,
uncertainty,

STRATEGIC:

rational decision-making,

formal planning,

intuitive

informal planning,

and risk are defined as follows:

that which is

important

(vital,

crucial)

to the

survivial of the firm as determined by the top executive
decision-maker in terms of actions taken,
committed,

and/or precedents

RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING:

resources

set.

the logical,

linear,

analytical

scientific process of making important choices in the
presence of an organizational objective with the intent of
meeting that objective.
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INTUITIVE DECISION-MAKING:
subjective,

a relational,

unsystematic,

perceptive process of making important choices

in the presence of an organizational objective with the
intent of meeting that objective.

FORMAL PLANNING:

any explicit process that is exemplified

by the expenditure of resources and the development of
written documentation articulating the outcome of current
decisions

(one year or more),

process(es)

the establishment of a

to guide and limit these future actions,

combination of corporate level plans
and the development of

INFORMAL PLANNING:
unstructured,

systems

the

into a unified whole,

for monitoring the results.

any implicit process that is an

undocumented,

resource expending,

and,

yet,

planned response to business related problems,
opportunities,

TOP EXECUTIVE:

or crises.

the individual who,

characteristically,

plays the dominant role in the process of establishing
corporate objectives,

setting planning horizons,

determining environmental assumptions,
progress toward the objectives,
agreed upon standards,
the corporate entity.

reviewing overall

as determined by previously

and generally guiding the efforts of
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UNCERTAINTY;

the difference between the information needed

to perform a task and the information available.
degree of

instability of the corporate environment

a concern in this

RISK:
odds)

The
is also

survey.

knowledge about the probability distribution

(the

of the consequences of a right or wrong decision

choice,

the variability of

the possible known outcomes.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses have evolved from the

five

theorems and from the literature review found in Chapter
II.
Hypothesis

:

The top executive's preference for using
"informal plans"
problems

is

to solve corporate

significantly related to

his/her perception of
of those problems

Hypothesis

§2:

the importance

(see Eliasson,

1976).

The top executive's perceived need to "buy
time"
making

for later,
is

more permanent decision

significantly related to his/her

preference for

"informal plans"

present time corporate decisions
Mintzberg,

et al.,

1976).

in making
(see
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Hypothesis

#3:

The top executives'
"formal plans"
making is

preference for using

in corporate decision

significantly related to the

instability and uncertainty of the
business environment in which the firm

Hypothesis

operates

(see Armstrong,

Aldrich,

1983).

1982 and Kurke &

The top executive's preference for "formal
plans"

in making a corporate decision is

significantly related to the risk to the
firm of a wrong decision

(see Armstrong,

1 982) .

Hypothesis

^5:

The top executives of Canadian
corporations are significantly more likely
to use

"formal plans"

in their corporate

decision making than are top executives of
U.S.

corporations

1 978) .

(Dickerson & Nadeau,
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Confounding Variables

The demographic variables of organizational size,
business sector operations,
education,

executive age,

executive

and executive years with the firm are all

in previous

noted

strategic management research as variables that

may impact the investigation of executive preferences and
beliefs

in business organizations.

demographic

In this

study,

information is used to analyze the impact all

the above variables may have on the issues of
formal/informal planning and rational/intuitive decision
making.

For example,

some earlier research differentiates

planning styles by corporate size
industry type
Malik,

1975;

Laforge,

(Galbraith,

(Litschert and Nicholson,
Kudla,

1981;

1980;

1974;

Thune and House,

Fulmer and Rue,

1973).

This

1979)

and

Karger and

1970;

Wood and

study will

employ statistical control techniques to analyze the
differences between U.S.

and Canadian survey respondents.

The Study Sample

The Sample Defined

The purpose of this study is

to identify relationships

or associations that may exist among and between sets of
observations.

Since the complete population of corporate
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top executives
sizes numbers

in American and Canadian businesses of all
in the hundreds of thousands,

sampling procedures

in an effort to define a

this study uses
subset or

portion of that population.
The population from which the sample is drawn consists
of large,

medium,

and small companies.

Defining the size

variable as related to business corporations
and inexact process.

Forbes magazine

(November 4,

its article on the "200 best small companies
define small as having gross

is a difficult
1985)

in

in America"

sales of between $1.0 million

and $300.0 million per year.

The U.S.

Small Business

Administration uses three general criteria -- number of
employees

(less than 500

industry groups,

full time employees),

related

and volume of dollar sales per year - to

define a small business.

Robinson

(1982)

defines

small

business as employing less than 50 people and/or having
less than $3.0 million in annual sales.
(1978)

Grollman and Colby

prefer to define small as a company having only one

to three key management people

(Woodward,

1958,

also

developed extensive empirical evidence suggesting the
number of employees on the corporate management team is the
best indicator of corporate size).

Broom

(1983)

says a

small company is any company with less than one hundred
employees.
500

The U.S.

Department of Commerce suggests under

full time employees as the appropriate cutoff point.
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Generally,

most organizational theorists use the

number of employees as the factor that determines size,
that measure is
variables as

likely to be less affected by such

inflation or other economic factors

the firm

(see in particular Chandler,

Rushing,

1965;

Blau,

1970;

complicated procedures

organizational
employees

is

medium firms;

Hall,

1977;
1967).

study and to avoid developing

for adjusting the fluctuating

exchange rate between the U.S.
full

1962;

impacting

and Lawerence and Lorsch,

For the purposes of this

the number of

as

and Canada,

this study uses

time employees as the determinant for

size.

The cutoff of five hundred

full-time

the predetermined break between small and
two thousand is the break between medium and

large firms.
The intent of this

study is to investigate the uses of

both formal and informal planning;

therefore,

the sample

must contain those firms who use or have the potential for
using both types of planning.
indicate that small
size of

Some empirical

studies

firms do not usually have access to the

financial resources that are required to establish

effective formal planning systems
Armstrong,

1982;

Curtis,

Sexton and Van Auken,
companies of
not used.

1983;

1982;

(see in particular

VanKirk and Noonan,

Robinson,

1982);

1982;

therefore,

less than one hundred and fifty employees are

Firms of

less than one hundred and fifty full

86

time employees are assumed to be either emerging firms
whose executives have not,

yet established their decision¬

making styles or unsophisticated firms that remain too
small to experience the type of decision-making and formal
planning discussed in this

study.

The Sample Frame

The sampling frame is Standards and Poors'
Corporate,

Directors,

corporation lists,

and Executives,

Volumes 1 and II.

are not completely comprehensive,
Ideally,

computerized,

the

and Dun and Bradstreet's Canadian

Business Directory,

inclusive.

Volume £1_,

Register of

While these lists

they are reasonably

a copy of these two references can be

each appropriate firm numbered,

and a

computerized number generator used to select each sample
firm.

However,

since these references contain both parent

corporations and their subsidiaries,
large firms,

small,

medium,

and listings that number in excess of

hundred thousand,

this method of

in both time and costs

and
four

selection is prohibitive

for a study of this kind.

A variation on the simple random sample techniques was
used to adequately obtain an appropriate

sample.

This

variation includes conducting a pilot study of both U.S.
and Canadian companies

in an effort to ascertain
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realistically the likely response rates.

The results of

the pilot study were used both to validate the
questionnaire and to develop simple statistics for use in
determining the appropriate sample size requirements
the various

scaled variables,

SIC categories,

for

and U.S.

to

Canadian comparisons.
The pilot survey indicated that the overall response
rate was greater than twenty-eight percent;
sample of

therefore,

a

four hundred Canadian and four hundred American

executives

(see Levy and Lemeshow,

1980,

p.

128)

is

believed to be adequate to provide for rigorous sampling
and yet meet cost and manpower constraints.

The following

section charts the random selection process used for both
the U.S.

and Canadian groups.

The U.S.

Sample;

- the number of pages in the Register of Corporate ^

,

Directors

and Executives,

1985,

volume

=

2682

- the average number of companies per page =17
- the average number of excluded small companies per page
=

6

- the average number of usable companies per page =11
- the total number of companies in the book =

45,000 of

which approximately 15,347 are excluded small companies.
- the total approximate number of usable companies = 29,650
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- the SIC classifications used will be as follows:
1.

Industrial =0111

2.

Financial =

3.

Service = 7011

Group

6011

to 5999
to 6999

to 8999

sample size *paqe chunk **Description

Industrial

1 50

/

2682

17.9

one every 1 8 pages

Financial

125

/

2682

21 .5

one every 22 pages

Service

1 25

/

2682

21 .5

one every 22 pages

The Canadian Sample;

- the number of pages

in the Dun and Bradstreet Canadian

Key Business Directory,

1986,

volumes I and II =

- the average number of companies per page =
-

529

28

the average number of excluded small companies per page
=

10

- the average number of usable companies per page =18
-

the total number of companies

in the book =

14,800 of

which approximately 5,180 are excluded small companies.
- the total approximate number of usable companies =
9,620.
- the SIC classifications used will be as follows:
1.

Industrial

2.

Financial = 6011

3. Service =

=0111

7011

to 5999
to 6999

to 8999
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Group

sample

size *paqe chunk **Description

Industrial

1 50

/

529

3.5

one every

Financial

1 25

/

529

4.2

one every 4 pages

Service

1 25

/

529

4.2

one every 4 pages

4 pages

* Use a four-digit or three-digit random number list to
determine the starting point.
**

If there is more than one firm of that group on the

page,

then use a two-digit random number

from among them.

list to select one

If no firms are on that page go on to the

next page chunk.

The Research Instrument

Data on top executive decision making came from
responses

to a mailed questionnaire.

debate in the field of

There is extensive

strategic management concerning the

reliability and validity of

information about executive

preferences and thinking obtained through mailed
instruments.

This method of data collection was chosen

because of two relevant concerns about the top executive
population and this
1.

Top executives

study:
in business enterprises are notoriously

difficult to reach for research purposes because their time
on the job is protected and,

to a certain extent,

controlled by the authority of their secretaries and
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assistants.
management
2.

These individuals are commonly referred to in
literature as the

The interest

"gate keepers".

in this research is not to develop a model

of how a few executives make their decisions
Mintzberg,

et al.,

1976),

(see

but rather to explore the value

top executives place on informal/formal plans

for making

decisions.
Given these two concerns,

a mailed questionnaire coupled

with follow-up interviews

seems the appropriate method for

gathering data to use in testing the hypotheses.
As noted above,
the firm.
the U.S.

This

the study surveys the top executive in

individual's title varies widely throughout

and Canada.

The top executive is also commonly

referred to as the corporate "chief executive officer"
(CEO).

In selecting the random sample,

the expected

recipient of the survey instrument was the name at the top
of the list of company corporate officers.
The questionnaire is developed through a deductive
process of reviewing prior,
hypotheses of interest,

related research,

developing

and drawing it all together in a

five-part survey instrument.

A panel of

seven academic

researchers reviewed and critiqued the closed-answer
questions and suggested critical modifications both
regarding question wording and instrument design.

Then the

revised questionnaire was administered in a semi-structured
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interview format to a group of five corporate chief
executive officers drawn from a convenience sample in the
local area.

These executives clarified definitions,

eliminated inappropriate questions,
suggested new questions,

added new insights that

and generally critiqued the draft

instrument from a top executive perspective.
revised questionnaire,
manuscript,

The final

as displayed in the appendix of this

was again administered to a different

convenience sample of

five executives who provided a final

critique and established a thiry minute response time for
completion of the questions.
As noted earlier,

formal and informal planning can be

viewed as extremes on a continuum.

The questions in the

survey instrument that relate to this continuum form three
primary categories:

formal plans,

informal plans,

mixture of formal and informal plans.

and a

Those questions in

the survey that relate specifically to one end of the
continuum or the other are as follows:
Formal Plans:

(the left end of each of the following
question response lines).
Questions
22-26,

Informal Plans:

1,

29,

2,

30,

3,
31,

5,

6,

7,

10,

11,

15,

35-38.

(the right end of each of the following
question response lines).
Questions

1,

2,

3,

5,

6,

7,

18-31,

35-39.
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Both Types of Plans:

(the middle point of the
Questions

1-3,

5-7,

lines).

10-11,

15,

18-31,

35-39.
Demographic questions are used as the control over
potentially confounding variables related to the issues of
formal/informal plans and rational/intuitive decision¬
making.
A literature search conducted in an effort to locate
other instruments for use in this research found none;
therefore,

this instrument was developed and pre-tested in

a pilot study of

140 U.S.

and Canadian firms.

conducted during January and February,
rate of

28.7%.

noted.

Fowler

1986,

The test
had a response

No unexpected or deviant results were
(1984,

p.147)

notes that with mailed

questionnaires early returns are particularly biased
samples when compared to later returns.

This problem was

particularly evident in the pilot study and was,
carefully examined in the later survey.

therefore,
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Data Collection,

Techniques

Procedures,

for Increasing Response Rates

In an effort to obtain as
possible,

numerous methods

were employed.

large a return from CEOs as

for increasing the response rate

Extensive work by some researchers

particular Heberlein and Baumbartner
(1977),

Armstrong

and Lade

and Processing

(1963),

(1975),

(1978),

Bachrack and Scoble

and Dillman

(1978))

(see in

Alwin,

ed.

(1967),

Boek

provides several

useful procedures that appear to increase dramatically the
overall response rate and thereby reduce the non-response
problem.

Some of

these major points,

have an impact on this
1.

study,

especially those that

include the following:

Establishment of realistic cut-off dates and

inclusion of that information in the questionnaire
packet improves the return rate.
2.

Inclusion of a prepaid envelope for the return of

responses
3.

improves the return rate.

A first follow-up mailing nets approximately an

additional

20% of

the initial return,

nets approximately an additional

a second follow-up

12% of the initial return;

and a third about 10%.
4.

A regular hand-stamped envelope produces a better return

result than a business reply envelope.
5.

Both the survey title and the opening paragraph of the
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cover letter can affect response rates by as much as 20%.
6.

A multilith or printed questionnaire produces

substantially better results than a photocopy instrument.
7.

Questionnaires receive better responses when they are

mailed first class.
8.

If confidentiality and anonymity are a concern,

enclose

a postcard that can be returned separately to indicate that
the respondent's name should be removed from the non¬
response
9.
10.

list.

Rank order and open-ended questions should be avoided.
Questionnaires that require more than one-half hour to

complete should be avoided.
11.

A diagram or pictorial on the questionnaire cover will

increase the return rate.
All of the above techniques were used in this survey
with two exceptions:
1.

the cover letter of the pilot survey requested a twelve-

day cutoff date.
Canada exceeds

However,

mail delivery and return in

sixteen days,

therefore,

the effect of potentially reducing,
returns from Canadian executives.

the cutoff date had

instead of increasing,
Because of this problem,

no cutoff date is used in the final survey cover letter.
2.

Because of the costs associated with a printed

instrument,

the final

instrument was reproduced via a high

quality photocopy process.
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While these procedures help maintain a high response
rate and,

therefore,

nonresponse,

a very high

top executives
Dillman

reduce the sources of error due to
(e.g.

over 35%)

response rate from

is not likely.

(1978)

suggests a seventy percent or better

response rate from a mailed questionnaire can be expected
if these suggestions are followed.
business executive surveys

A review of recent

indicates that a realistic

response rate for this type of

study is about twenty-seven

percent.

The following are four reviews of such surveys;

1.

(1975)

Miller

received a 27% return rate in three

mailings to Boston metropolitan top business executives.
2.

Milman

(1985)

received a 15% return rate in one mailing

to Canadian top business executives.
3.

Agor

to U.S.
4.

(1985)

received a 35% return rate in three mailings

top and middle level business executives.

Carlisle and Michael

(1984-85)

rate in three mailings to U.S.

received a 29% return

and Canadian top business

executives.
The question of anonymity is of concern to executives
of both private and public enterprises therefore,

this

survey maintained the confidentiality of the respondents by
asking each to return a postcard advising the researcher to
remove the executive's name from future mailing lists.
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The Survey Time Frames

The questionnaires were mailed to the sample
population according to the following schedule:
Day

z

Day §^0z

March 21,

1986,

the first packets were mailed.

March 31,

1986,

the postcard reminders were

1986,

the second group of packets were

mailed.
Day §26i

April

17,

mailed.
Day §73z

June 2,

1986,

the data collection phase was

terminated.
In addition to the questionnaire,
included a self-addressed,
a "yes,

I have responded"

postcard,

the packet mailings

hand-stamped,

business envelope,

self-addressed and stamped

and a cover letter.

mailing included a stamped,

The reminder postcard

self-addressed "Yes,

like another questionnaire as

I would

I've misplaced mine"

postcard

(see the Appendix).

Quality Control of Data Entry

As the questionnaires were returned,
coded,

they were dated,

and entered on computer coding sheets.

This

information was then entered manually into a computer data
file.

Previous research by Miller

(1983)

and Fowler

(1984)

indicates that coding closed-end questions can lead to
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approximately a

1% error rate in the coding process.

though this potential error rate is rather low,

Even

a second

statistician checked and verified the work of the first.
No errors

in the coding process were detected during this

procedure.

The Executive Interviews

After the survey data was collected and analyzed,
three corporate presidents who indicated on the return
postcards an interest in being interviewed were randomly
selected from both the Canadian and the U.S.

mailing lists.

An interview visit was subsequently arranged with each of
these participants.

The intent of these on-site visits was

to verify or refute the findings of the questionnaire
survey.

Jick

(1979:

603)

refers to this process as

"triangulation" or multiple view points that allow for
greater accuracy.

The expected result is a research study

that has counterbalanced its weaknesses with the strengths
of another methodology.
meetings explained,

In the case of this

clarified,

study these

and/or documented with hard

observable facts that information obtained via quantitative
survey methods.

These observations were then summarized as

to their relationship to the findings of the questionnaire.
The information obtained via this qualitative methodology
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helps

substantiates

that of

the survey study.

of the overall project began on May 8,
on May 14,

(Schwartz and Jacobs,

the interviews were formed around a select number of

open-ended questions.

These questions are roughly

equivalent to those numbered 1,
37,

1986 and concluded

1986.

Using unstructured techniques
1979)

This phase

39,

40,

44,

and 50

4,

8,

14,

21,

25,

30,

31,

in the questionnaire.

Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing

Statistical Analysis

The dependent

(criterion)

variables of interest

include both formal and informal plans while the
independent

(predictor)

as decision risk,

variables

importance,

include such categories

perceived need to "buy time"

and the stability of the external environment.

These

independent variables are amalgamations of the following
survey questions

(please refer to the questionnaire in the

appendix):
- decision importance = questions 22,
- decision riskiness

= questions

35,

23,

and 25.

37.

- environmental stability = questions 29-31.
- buying time = questions 24,

26.
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In addition to these primary variables there are several
other questions within the survey that relate to the
personal preferences of the CEO from a rational/intuitive
standpoint.

Questions 1,

2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 come from the

literature concerning rational decision making and
intuitive decision making.
literature,

It is

although not tested,

strongly suggested in the
that a totally rational

thinker will tend to rely almost exclusively on formal
planning methods as a tool

in decision making,

while a

primarily intuitive thinker will tend to rely on informal
planning methods as a tool

in decision making.

The

responses to these six questions will allow an individual
to be at least labelled as a thinker that is
rational,

or a mixture of both.

intuitive,

this rational/formal

and intuitive/informal theory is true,

then there should be

very high positive correlations in the formal/rational and
informal/intuitive matchings.
These major and minor analyses

lead to a more

comprehensive comparison between Canadian and U.S.
executives,

top

holding constant the confounding variables

noted earlier.

Basic demographic information as contained

in the questionnaire will be used to analyze the impact CEO
education,
issues of
making.

years with a firm,

and CEO age may have on the

formal/informal planning as methods of decision
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The nonparametric tests appropriate to this

study

dependent on assuming the Likert-like scales used in the
questionnaire are "ordinal."
will be median,
Correlation,

frequency,

and so forth.

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Canadian responses

Thus,

the statistics used

chi-square,

the Spearman Rank

Multi-table chi-square and the

Z will be used to compare the U.S.
(Hypothesis 5).

Nonparametric

evaluation of this type of data requires
analysis of
symmetry,

statistical

such concerns as central tendency,

and normality.

and

dispersion,

The results of this analysis

is

reported in Chapter IV.

The Nonrespondent Problem

There is no known method for eliminating the problem
of nonresponse by survey members.

An extensive effort at

increasing the response rate by developing a survey program
that maximizes the likelihood of any particular
questionnaire recipient's completing and returning the
instrument,

is the best approach to solving the problem.

Two forms of errors still remain a concern:
observation errors and non-observation errors.

Observation

errors are likely in that the population from which the
sample was drawn is not one hundred percent complete;
therefore,

non-coverage is a problem.

The likelihood that

the names and addresses obtained from the sampled source
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books are erroneous

further complicates the non-coverage

issue.

is of marginal concern.

However,

it

Of greater

concern is trying to determine if a bias exists between
those who did not respond and those who did.

One approach

to solving this problem is to estimate the sample size
based on a minimally expected rate of return

(please refer

to the sample selection section of this chapter).
method is

Another

simply to report the extent of non-responses and

assume the response subset is representative of the larger
non-response set.

Survey research finds that non¬

respondents often differ substantially from respondents on
several key variables:
and income.

education,

age,

occupational status,

Three of the above four variables were

statistically controlled during the analysis phase,
the fourth,

income,

is deemed too threatening to top

executives to be included and was,
However,

while

therefore,

excluded.

respondents and nonrespondents are compared on the

variables of executive age,
environmental turbulence,

organizational size,

and sales.

SIC codes,

Ignoring these

differences among potential non-respondents seriously
compromises this

study.

In addition,

an examination of

non-respondents was carried out via a telephone survey
conducted during the week of May 25,
the questionnaire phase.

1986,

near the end of

The intent of this

follow-up

procedure is to ascertain how non-respondents who are
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willing to discuss the survey over the telephone might
differ from respondents.
similar enough to mail

Such telephone surveys are not

surveys to allow direct comparisons

largely because of self-selection and interpretation
problems.

Also time analysis

studies

indicate that any

such validity check must be conducted as

soon as possible

after the completion of the mailed phase so as to reduce
selection,

maturation,

(Campbell and Stanley,

and mortality validity problems
1963).

In spite of these efforts,

direct population parameter generalizations cannot be made.
However,

such an exploration is useful for future research

studies.

Validity and Reliability

One of

the significant drawbacks to correlational

research is the difficulty of adequately validating the
procedures and instruments used.

The instrument to be used

in this study is new and untested which dramatically
escalates the validity problem.

Numerous authors

castigate correlational ex post facto research
particular Campbell and Stanley,
1979;

Kerlinger,

1973).

However,

1963;

(see in

Cook and Campbell,

most of these concerns

relate to the lack of validity and reliability checks done
on previously conducted correlational studies.

Therefore,
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this

study employs an extensive program aimed at clearly

documenting its validity.
major concern in this

The following categories are of

study:

Content validity:

A seven member academic and a five

member executive panel was used in the earlier stages of
the questionnaire development to review and validate the
content of each question.
Construct validity:

An attempt at providing construct

validity can best be accomplished by statistical techniques
that hold out such intervening variables as age,
type of industry,

etc.

In addition,

education,

method variance can be

reasonably controlled via a thorough literature review to
determine previously documented knowledge.

The use of

several different questions asking for the same data helps
verify the proposed constructs.
questionnaire,

As can be noted in the

some similar questions use different

response scales which also allows for method validity
checks

(see questions

24 &

26 and questions 21

&

38).

The

extensive double pretest procedure eliminates most format,
item content,

and general

instruction problems that might

lead to construct validity problems.

Convergent validity

was checked through the use of factor analysis of the
informal/formal dichotomy.
Statistical conclusion validity:

The yerification of

type I and type II errors in correlational research is

extremely important.
items

is

The internal consistency of the test

tested using Chombach's Alpha.

Although opinion

varies on standards of reliability Nunnally

(1967)

suggests

that in the early stages of research reliabilities in
excess of

.50 are acceptable for a new instrument,

reliabilities approaching
Alpha for the items
(see Table 4).

.80 are preferable.

in this survey ranged from

although

Coefficient
.701

to

.861

Also inter-item correlations were

appropriately high.

In addition,

the conclusions are

useful only if the sample adequately resembles the
population.

Therefore,

a telephone survey of a random

sample of the non-respondents was conducted and a
comparison of the demographic characteristics of the
respondent firms to the nonrespondent firms was used to
ascertain whether or not the two groups are in fact
similar.
External validity;
through the careful
addition,

This problem was controlled

selection of the sample group.

In

the survey and analysis of the non-respondents

further reduces external validity concerns.
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TABLE 4
INSTRUMENT RELIABILITY

Variable Group

Hypothesis §

Alpha Value

Q22,Q23,Q25

1

.86088

Q27,Q28,Q29,Q30

3

.70144

Q20,Q21,Q25

5

.82627

CHAPTER

IV

PRESENTATION OF SURVEY RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the study,
three parts.

in

The first section discusses the general

profile of the executives who responded to the survey.

The

second section uses the questionniare data to document and
discuss the hypotheses tested.

A third section reviews

potential problems with the validity of the findings.
Following these three sections.

Chapter V discusses the

implications these results have for the field of strategic
management.

Part 1 -- The Respondent Profile

The Response Rates

A total of

324 returns were received from a mailing of

800 questionnaires.

Of these 324 responses,

69 were

undeliverable postal returns and 18 were unanswered
questionnaires attached to letters from executives who
declined to participate in the study
leaves a total of

(see Table 5).

237 usable questionniare returns.

overall return rate is 29.6% while the return rate to
deliverable mailings

is 33.2%
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(see Table 6).

This
The
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TABLE 5
DELIVERED,

UNDELIVERED,

Deliverable Mail:

Total

AND REFUSED QUESTIONNAIRES

- Undeliverable^

=

Total

USA

391

20

=

366

Canada

391

44

=

347

Total

782

69

713

Recipient Refusals^^
USA

9

Canada

9

Total

♦Returned,

18

unopened,

by the respective postal authority.

random telephone check revealed numerous reasons for these
returns from corporate bankruptcy to the death of the
addressee.
♦♦These targeted executives returned the blank
questionniares with an explanation that company policy,
personal policy,
participating.

or time constraints prevented them from

A
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TABLE 6
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

Country/Sector

Sent Out

Returned

Return Rate

USA:
Industrials

1 50

55

36.7%

Financials

125

41

32.8

Service

1 25

41

32.8

400

1 37

34.8%

Industrials

150

40

26.7%

Financials

125

25

20.0

Service

125

35

28.0

Subtotals

400

1 00

25.0%

Grand Total

800

237

29.6%

Subtotals

Canada:

Adjusted Response Rate with Undeliverables Deleted*
Deliverable

Returns

Return Rate

USA:

366

1 37

37.4%

Canada:

347

100

28.8

Grand Total:

71 3

237

33.2%

♦Please refer to Table 5

for clarification
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Sample Corporate Characteristics

The survey includes three hundred industrial,
hundred and fifty financial,
service companies
32.8%,
and 28%

and two hundred and fifty

(see Table 6)

with return rates of 36.7%,

and 32.8% respectively for the U.S.
for the Canadians.

sector,

and 32.1%

and 26.7%,

20%,

Forty per cent of the

respondents are from the industrial
fi^Q^ricial

two

sector,

27.7%

from the

from the service sector.

The number of full time employees for these respondent
companies ranges from 40 to 50,000.
full

time employees

for U.S.

the Canadian firms averages
the respondents have from 40
pages 84-85

to 2,000

for clarification);

to 500

1,895 while that of

Fifty-four per cent of
(small

size firms

full-time employees;

(medium size firms

11.1%

firms - see pages 88-89

is

2,388.

for Clarification)

f^om 500

over 10,000

firms

The average number of

from 2,000

—

full-time employees

29.6%

see pages 84—85

to 10,000

for clarification);

- see

(large size

and 3.9% have

(large size firms - see

pages 84-85).

Sample Executive Characteristics

The average U.S.
about

56 years old,

over ten years,

executive responding to this study is

has been in his/her position for a bit

has received a college degree,

behind an office door titled "president."

and sits

The typical
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Canadian respondent is 52 years old, has a college degree,
and also answers to the title of "president."
Respondents ages ranges from a low of 30 years to a
high of 87.
(6.8%)

Years of education range from less than 12

to over 18 years

include 59 B.A.'s,
others.

(15.8%).

8 M.A.'s,

33 M.B.A.'s,

6 Ph.D.'s, and

The major areas of educational or vocational

interests include business
liberal arts
7 and 8,

The degrees received

(n=100), engineering (n=38),

(n=22), and law (n=19).

As attested in tables

these respondents have tended to stay with the

same company (e.g.

71% have worked with fewer than four

firms and 15% have worked for only one firm during their
working years.)

TABLE 7
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS

Years of formal education (question 41):
n

median

U.S.A.

1 29

16.294

Canada

93

16.261

Mann Whitney U
=
6493 .5
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 11543 .5

std err.

mean

std dev

.252

16.140

2.858

.387

15.462

3.729

Z = .7070
2-tailed prob. = .4796*

* There are no significant differences between U.S. and
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance.

Years in present icorporate position (question 45):
n

median

U.S.A.

1 30

10.278

.823

12.246

9.361

Canada

93

8.600

.971

10.097

9.156

Mann Whitney U
=
5796.5
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 10846.5

std err.

mean

std dev

Z = 2.0857
2-tailed prob. =
.0370*

* There is a significant difference between U.S. and Canada
on this issue at the .05 level of significance (i.e. U.S.
executives have been in their present corporate positions
longer than their Canadian counterparts).

1 1 2

TABLE 7 Continued (page 2)
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS

Present age of respondent (question 50):

U.S.A.
Canada

n

median

1 33

56.688

97

52.000

Mann Whitney U
=
5208
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 10258

std err.

mean

std dev.

.896

55.639

10.338

.930

51 .186

9.156

= 3.2681
2-tailed prob. =
.0011*

* There is a significant difference between U.S. and Canada
on this issue at the .05 level of significance (i.e. the
U.S. executives in this survey tend to be older than their
Canadian counterparts).

The corporate business environment (question 30)**;

U.S.A.
Canada

n

median

1 37

3.392

.082

3.416

.960

100

3.226

.107

3.202

1 .069

Mann Whitney U
=
6066
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 11016

std err.

mean

std dev.

= 1 .4420
Z
2-tailed prob. =
.1493*

* There is no significant difference between U.S. and
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance.
** Question 30 asks how the executive would describe the
firm's business environment using a continuum from stable
to volatile.
See the Appendix).
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TABLE 7 Continued (page 3)
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS

The corporate business environment (question 30):
n

median

Industrial

95

3.230

.105

3.255

.105

Financial

66

3.611

.110

3.545

.898

Service

76

3.208

.124

3.224

1 .078

Mann Whitney U
=
6348.5
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W = 12164.5

std err.

mean

std dev

Z
= -.8843
2-tailed prob. =
.3765*

* There is no significant difference between U.S. and
Canada on this issue at the .05 level of significance.

TABLE 8
RESPONDENT VITAL STATISTICS

The Primary Job Titles of the Respondents (question 44),
Chairman

15
5

•

52
47

CEO

•

U. S.
Canada

Pres.

>

Country

COO

4
9

50
22

Other

1
1

15
16

The Highest Educational Degree Earned by the Respondents
(question 42).
Country

HS

BA

BS

MA

MS

MBA

7
4

36
23

28
10

2
6

5
8

18
15

U. S.
Canada

PhD

Other

4
2

37
32

The Major Area of Educational or Vocational Training
(question 43).
Country
U. S.
Canada

Bus

Sci

Law

58
42

4
3

13
6

Lib Art
15
7

Econ
6
1

Engeer
21
17

Other
20
24

11 5

Part II — Hypothesis Testing

This section presents the five major hypotheses and
draws test conclusions.

These hypotheses have been

previously presented in Chapter III but are now discussed
individually.
In order to avoid false assumptions about this
population of executives, distribution-free or
nonparametric techniques are used to analyze the data
related to these hypotheses (see Chapter III for further
clarification).

The instrument items are generally ordinal

in design and utilize a Likert-like response line.

Results of Hypotheses

Hypothesis £1_:

The top executive's preference for

using informal plans to solve corporate problems is
significantly related to his/her perception of the
importance of those problems (see Eliasson, 1976).
This hypothesis, as proposed by Eliasson, assumes that
an extremely important corporate problem will require the
use of informal plans to solve it.

Perhaps the decision

must be made quickly or the executive feels, since (s)he
will be credited with either a right or a wrong choice,
(s)he is safest relying on personal experience and
knowledge rather than formal approaches.

The instrument
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questions (see the Appendix) related to this hypothesis are

,

22

23, and 25.

Each of these questions relates the

concept of importance to the choice of formal or informal
plans.

Question twenty-five substitutes the word strategic

for important.
fold.

The intent in this substitution is two¬

1.) if the respondent has carefully read the

operational definitions on the cover sheet (see pages 79-81
& Appendix) then (s)he will equate important problems with
strategic problems and answer both questions similarly, 2.)
later question comparisons can be made as a means of
multiple ratings per subject reliability and agreement
analysis.

As the questions progress from 22 to 25 in the

questionnaire the frame of reference for the respondent
becomes more and more personal.

Question 22 primarily asks

what type of planning executives should rely on in making
important decisions.

While question 23 then asks the

respondent which type of planning is most used, question 25
asks which kind the respondent personally uses in making
important or strategic corporate decisions.
The observed frequencies and relative frequencies are
computed for each variable and summarized in Tables 9, 10,
and 11.

In addition chi-square statistics are computed to

test the null hypothesis that the observed frequencies do
not significantly differ from the equal frequency
distribution expected if respondents answer randomly.

The

calculations

suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis.

Due to other than chance alone,
difference at the

.05

level,

responded to questions 22,

there is a significant

between how these executives

23,

and 25 and the expected

equal distribution of their responses on those questions.
The literature provides no guidelines of what to
expect in a frequency distribution of executive preference
for informal plans
therefore,

in making important corporate decisions;

a conceivably realistic distribution was

developed that places 5%,
responses

10%,

20%,

30%,

and 35% of the

into each of the five categories from formal to

informal respectively.
proportions,

Based on these expected

a second directional chi-square was computed

to determine if,

in fact,

these respondents did prefer

informal plans when making important corporate decisions.
Expectations

suggest that the chi-square value may decrease

as the expected values come closer to matching the observed
values.
9,

10,

The directional chi-square values
and 11

increases.

indicate that each value dramatically

This

suggests that these respondents prefer

using formal rather than informal plans.
this

is

shown in Tables

indeed true,

To determine if

standardized residuals based on the

skewed expected values,

noted earlier,

Tables 9,

These standardized deviates are

10,

and 11).

used to examine patterns

were computed

(see

in the data that contribute to a

TABLE 9
Questions Related to Hypothesis

Q22:

When the problem being considered is believed to be
extremely important to the firm, on what type of
plans should the top executive rely in making the
final decision?

Scale

Formal =

Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

1

35

14.8%

+6.7250

2

60

25.3

+7.4564

3

95

40.1

+6.9138

4

27

11 .4

-5.2300

Informal = 5

5

2.1

-8.5587

Total n = 237
Median
= 2,668
Mean
= 2.581

Standard Error
=
Standard Deviation =

Chi-Square
= 106.919
Directed Chi-Square* = 265.056

D.F. = 4
D.F, = 4

.065
.970

Sign.
Sign,

=
=

.000
,000

♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5,
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5)
respectively, as the theory suggests.
This chi-square
value indicates that these respondents are substantially
different than theoretically expected.

TABLE 10
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS

Q23;

In making important
routine)

(as opposed to ordinary or

strategic decisions which type of plans are

most used?
Scale

Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

1

32

13.5%

+5.8535

2

63

26.6

+8.0727

3

71

30.0

+3.4279

4

47

19.8

-2.8581

Informal = 5

12

5.1

-7.7901

Formal =

Total n = 237
Median
= 2.746
Mean
= 2.751

Standard Error
=
.073
Standard Deviation = 1.102

50.267
Chi-Square
Directed Chi-Square* = 188.999

D.F.
D.F.

= 4
= 4

Sign.
Sign.

=
=

.000

*The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5,
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5)
respectively, as the theory suggests.
This Chi-square
indicates that these respondents are substantially
different than theoretically expected.

TABLE 11
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS

Q25:

In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do
you prefer?

Observed
Frequency

Scale

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

1

42

17.7%

+8.7585

2

63

26.6

+8.0727

3

73

30.8

+3.7184

4

44

18.6

-3.2139

Informal = 5

1 4

5.9

-7.5705

Formal =

Total n = 237
Median
= 2.678
Mean
= 2.682

Standard Error
=
.074
Standard Deviation = 1.143

Chi-Square
=
43.53
Directed Chi-Square* = 224.29

D.F. = 4
D.F. = 4

Sign.
Sign.

=
=

.000
.000

♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5,
10, 20, 20, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5)
respectively, as the theory suggests.
This Chi-square
indicates that these respondents are substantially
different than theoretically expected.

a significant chi-square test.

The residual values move

from positive to negative sign suggesting that these
respondents do indeed prefer a distribution other than the
one the theory suggests.
An analysis of question 22
plans executives should use,

(see Table 9)

asking which

indicates that 40.1% of these

respondents prefer formal plans and 40.1% prefer both
formal and informal plans while only 13.5% prefer informal
plans.

Based on question 22 and the above chi-square

tests, a null hypothesis stating that formal plans are
preferred in making important corporate decisions cannot be
rej ected.
Question 23

(see Table 10)

asks which plans are most

used by executives.

The results indicates that 40.1%

prefer formal plans;

30% prefer both formal and informal

plans; and only 24.9% prefer informal plans.

Based on

responses to question 23 a null hypothesis stating that
formal plans are preferred by these executives also can not
be rejected.
An analysis of question 25, which asks which plans the
respondent personally prefers,
formal plans,

indicates that 44.3% prefer

30.8% prefer both formal and informal plans,

and only 24.5% prefer informal plans in making strategic
corporate decisions.
These recorded frequencies, when they are examined

using standardized residuals and chi-square tests,

indicate

that the overall null hypothesis should be rejected.
Eliasson may,

in fact,

be wrong,

as it appears these

respondents prefer formal plans over informal plans in
making important corporate decisions.

Further empirical

studies need to be conducted to substantiate the
directionality of these findings and to determine how
executive preferences differ from actual behavior.
As noted earlier,
five

questions twenty-three and twenty-

(see the Appendix)

responses

are very similar;

to these two questions

therefore,

should be highly related.

An analysis of the level of agreement between these two
questions

(see Table 12)

using the Spearman rank order

correlation shows a very high agreement at the
significance.

.05

level of

The overall Kappa's value indicates only a

moderate degree,

beyond chance,

subject ratings reliability,

of multiple item per

and McNemars test of symmetry

suggests inability to reject the null hypothesis that these
executives are consistent in their answers.
reliability of these two items

The

is highly substantiated.

TABLE 12
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS

Q23 with Q25
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr.
McNemars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.6981

9.610

.492

Sign

df

.001

.3830

ASE1

T-Value

.045

14.962

.043

13.563

9

Hypothesis £2:
"buy time"

The top executive's perceived need to

for later,

more permanent decision making is

significantly related to his/her preference for using
informal plans

in making present time corporate decisions

(see Mintzberg,

et al.,

This hypothesis,
colleagues,

1976).

as developed by Mintzberg and his

assumes that most executives find it useful to

delay making permanent decisions and,
on informal plans and gut reactions
making.
Quinn

This

(198(v)

supports

therefore,

rely more

in their decision

implications by Wrapp

(1967)

and

that decisions made from informal plans are

more easily changed in the future than those made from
formal plans.
The questions in the questionnaire related to this
hypothesis are 24 and 26

(see the Appendix).

Each question

selects a type of plan to be used to make decisions in an
effort to buy time and then asks the respondent to note
whether

(s)he agrees or disagrees.

mirror images of each other.

These two questions are

If a respondent answers

towards one end of the number line on question 24,

(s)he

should answer toward the opposite end on question 26.
Tables

13

and 14 display the results of the

questionnaire responses and the computed statistics.
null hypothesis

The

states there is no significant difference

between the observed frequencies and the expected
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frequencies as distributed equally among cells.
square tests
the null

indicate a significant difference;

The chitherefore,

is rejected and a directional alternative

accepted.

Since the theory suggests informal plans and

buying time are related,

a

second directional chi-square

value was computed with the preset expected values
allocated proportionately from 5% to 35% as noted earlier
in the hypothesis
example,

discussion.

In question 24,

35% of the total 237 responses

allocated to "strongly agree" and 5%
to "strongly disagree" with 10%,
allocated to 2,

3,

theory is correct,

(11.85)

20%,

and 4 respectively.

expected allocations

(82.95)

for

are

is allocated

and 30% proportions
Question 26 has

in the opposite direction.

If the

then the directional chi-square value

should be substantially smaller than that of the equally
distributed test.
indicates

this

A careful review of Tables 13 and 14

is not the case.

An analysis of

the

standardized residuals for both question 24 and 26
no consistent pattern in either direction.
frequencies

suggests

A review of the

seems to imply that these respondents have

definite opinions,

but that their preferences are not

significantly skewed toward either formal or informal
plans.
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TABLE 13
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §2

Q24:

It is often useful to make an initial decision based
on informal plans

(in an effort to "buy time")

and

later amend or revoke that decision based on formal
strategic plans.

Scale

Observed
Frequency

Strongly
Disagree = 1
(formal)
2

Strongly
Agree
=
(informal)

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

5.1%

+.0436

12
65

27.4

+8.4835

3

31

13.1

-2.3821

4

11 2

47.3

+4.8505

5

6

2.5

-8.4489

Total n = 237
Median
= 3.545
Mean
= 3.155
Chi-Square
Directed Chi-Square* =

=
Standard Error
Standard Deviation =
170.239
180.421

D.F.
D.F.

=
=

4
4

.065
1.040
Sign.
Sign.

=

.000

*The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5,
10, 20, 30, 35 from "formal" (1) to "informal" (5)
respectively, as the theory suggests.
This Chi-square
indicates that these respondents are substantially
different than theoretically expected.

TABLE 14
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §2

Q26:

It is often useful to make an initial decision based
on formal plans

(in an effort to "buy time")

and later

amend or revoke that decision based on informal
strategic plans.

Observed
Frequency

Scale

Strongly
Disagree =
(informal)

Strongly
Agree
=
{formal)

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

+2.9485

1

22

2

117

49.4

+ 19.1649

3

35

14.8

-1.8011

4

49

20.7

-2.6209

5

2

.8

-8.8881

Total n = 237
Median
= 2.274
Mean
= 2.52
Chi-Square*
=
Directed Chi-Square** =

9.3%

=
Standard Error
Standard Deviation =
170.622
118.235

D.F.
D.F.

= 4
= 4

.064
.969

Sign.
Sign.

.000
.000

*A low cell count in scale number 5 (i.e. less than 5
cases) may have distorted the results of the Chi-Square as
reported here.
The expected cell counts were treated as
equal in this test.
**Expected values were preset proportionately at 5, 10,
30, 35 from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1)
respectively.

20,

On question 24,

32.5% of the respondents prefer formal

plans while 49.8% prefer informal plans and 13.1% are
undecided.

In question 26

58.7% prefer informal plans

while 21.5% prefer formal plans and 13% are undecided.
the two questions are taken together,

If

the majority of these

respondents prefer informal plans for decision making when
there is a perceived need to "buy time."
Based on these findings the null hypothesis of no
difference can be rejected and a directional alternative
hypothesis accepted.

However,

a null hypothesis

stating a

preference for formal plans cannot be definitely rejected
without further empirical research.
As noted earlier,
images of each other.

questions 24 and 26

are mirror

If respondents are responding

accurately these two questions will be highly negatively
correlated

(see Table 15).

The Spearman rank order

correlation indicates no significant correlation between
these two variables.

The McNemar's test of

symmetry

indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that people are
consistent in their responses.

Finally the Kappa value

indicates very poor agreement,

beyond reasonable chance,

multiple item per subject ratings reliability.

of

These test

results suggest no definite conclusions can be drawn about
hypothesis

§2 without conducting further empirical testing.

In summary hypothesis

#2 cannot be adequately tested
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TABLE 15
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS

Q24 with Q26
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr.
McNeraars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.0731

29.997

.145

Sign

df

.138

.0009

ASEI

T-Value

.069

-1 .052

.046

3.515

10

due

to

the

inconsistencies

to both question
statistically
proposition

24

substantial

plans

significantly
the business

Kurke

&

environment

Meinhart,

(1983)

in rapidly

changing business

executives

to

use
to

informal
time

decisions without

and Godiwalla,

noting

that

preference

for

is

firm operates
& Warde,

(see

1981;

the more

and

out and

thoroughly

it

and

(1981)

require

the need

for quick

discussions.
suggests

the business
is

operating

in their decision making

internal

turbulent

the more necessary

firms

environments will

plans

et.al.

becomes

as

(1975).

suggest that

constraints

lengthy

(1982)

corporate

this

1983).

Kurke and Aldrich

due primarily

no

instability and uncertainty of

in which the

Godiwalla,

Aldrich,

et al.

in corporate decision making
to the

responses

can be made about

The top executives

related

1982;

of

Therefore,

statements

suggested by Mintzberg,

formal

Armstrong,

comparisons

and question 26.

Hypothesis £3:
using

in the

Armstrong

the opposite
environment

to make carefully

substantiated decisions.

He

thought-

feels

executive depends more and more on formal

the

plans

change accelerates.
The

survey

questions

instrument

first presents

that help determine

environmental

change as

respondent

then

is

a

series

the executive's

related

to his/her

in an appropriately

of

perception of

firm.

thoughtful

The
frame of
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mind before being asked

to

for making decisions

that business

Question
choose a

31

(see Table

type of

decisions

in

the

asks

change has

Chi-square

statistics

are

hypothesis

that

is

there

difference
calls

for

is

the

.05

rejection of

the

null

when

the

that

turbulence

considered.
indicates

of

differences

Questions
determine

is

27

a

the

30

level of

of

17)

asks

its

changing business

18)

asks

(see Table

19)

to each

for

faced by the
Question

firm's marketing practices

product/service
asks

if

external

is

residuals also
random

the Appendix)

environment;

the

planning methods

environment

standardized

change

A

significance which

and acceptance of

preference

(see

random

and the observed

between the expected

thru

null

the questionnaire.

respective organization.

about

the

the observed distribution of

the amount

how the

test

line,

the business

A review of

distribution and

his/her

there

environment.

equally dispersed

found at

alternative

environment

no difference between a

received via

to

suited to making

to

Likert-like position on the number
as

the executive

on that

computed

responses,

frequency values

environment.

present organizational

impact

distribution of

16)

the best planning method

plan appropriately

in his/her

considering

select

question

life cycles;

responses.
are used to

respondent
27

in

(see Table

are affected by
28

(see Table

question

environmental

changes

29

TABLE

16

#3

QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS

Q31:

Based on your

response

to questions

likely

informal

or

to use

important

Scale

Informal

=

=

Total n =
Median
=
Mean
=

in making

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

8.0%

-4.0225

1

1 9

2

52

21 .9

+

3

70

29.5

+3.4646

4

74

31 .2

+4.0518

5

17

7.2

-4.3160

232
3.143
3.078

Chi-Square^
Chi-Square^^

*The

plans

are you more

corporate decisions?

Observed
Frequency

Formal

formal

27-30

=
=

63.905
18.344

expected values

are

.8221

=
Standard Error
Standard Deviation =

.071
.3041

=
=

.000
.3041

df
df

=
=

4
16

Sign,
Sign.

preset at equal

in each cell.

♦♦This chi-square test represents a test of the goodness
of fit between questions 31 and 30 as suggested in
hypothesis

§3,

TABLE
QUESTIONS

Q27:

How often must
practices
and

the

Frequent

to keep up with your

=

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

-4 .9965

5.5%

13

2

38

16.0

-1 .3653

3

66

27.8

+ 2 .7016

4

73

30.8

+ 3 .7184

5

35

14.8

-1 .8011

Mean

3.351

Chi-Square*

competitors

1

237
3.432

=

its marketing

changing market place?

Total n =
Median
=

♦The

your organization change

Observed
Frequency

=

§3

RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS

in order

Scale

Rarely

17

=

53 .289

expected values

Standard Error
Standard Deviation
df

are

=

4

Significance

set at equal

.074
rr

1 .109
.000

in each cell

TABLE 18
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3

Q28: How would you describe your organizations productservice obsolescence rate?

Scale

Very Slow

Very Fast

Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

= 1

28

11 .8%

-2.5342

2

63

26.6

+2.6833

3

80

33.8

+5.2175

4

40

16.9

-0.7454

= 5

14

5.9

-4.6212

Total n = 225
Median = 2.769
Mean
= 2.773
Chi-Square * = 62 .756

=
.072
Standard Error
Standard Deviation = 1.076
df = 4

Significance = .000

♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell.

TABLE 19
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3

Q29: How much do external changes threaten your firm?

Scale

Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)

Very Little = 1

11

4.6%

2

33

13.9

-2.0916

3

44

18.6

- .4938

4

102

43.0

+7.9306

= 5

36

15.2

-1 .6558

Great Deal

Total n = 237
Median = 3.745
Mean
= 3.527
Chi-Square* = 102 .451

Standardized
Residuals
-5.2870

Standard Error
=
.072
Standard Deviation = 1.076
df = 4

Significance = .000

♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell.

threaten the organization; and finally question 30
Table 20)

(see

has the executive choose a description of the

firm's environment.

The computed chi-square values for all

four questions suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis
of no difference between a random equal expected
distribution of responses and the observed frequency
distribution at a .05 level of significance.

A review of

the standardized residuals suggests that these respondents
feel they face both stable and volatile environmental
changes.

,

Questions 27 and 29
(e.g.

when compared to question 31

the executives preference for formal or informal

plans)

(see Table 21), has a significant Spearman rank

correlation value at the .05 significance level.
only question 28 compared to 31

However,

shows adequate symmetry

through McNemars test but it does not have a significant
Spearman correlation.

Furthermore none of the comparisons

has even modest multiple rater reliabilities.
Of particular interest is how well these respondents
fit with the theory espoused by Armstrong

(i.e. executives

prefer formal plans for decision making in turbulent
environments).

A perusal of Table 22

establishes that

there is a very poor relationship between variables 30 and
31 .

If the theory is correct,

the Spearman rank order

correlation should produce an extremely high negative value
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TABLE 20
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS §3

Q30:

How would you describe your firm's business
environment at the present time?

Scale

Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)

= 1

7

3.0%

2

43

18.1

-.6113

3

82

34.6

+5.0653

4

74

31 .2

+3.9009

Volatile = 5

30

12.7

-2.5036

Stable

Total n = 236
Median
= 3.329
Mean
= 3.326
Chi-Square* = 81 .754

Standardized
Residuals

-5.8513

=
.066
Standard Error
Standard Deviation = 1 .010
df = 4

Significance =

.000

♦The expected values are preset at equal in each cell

TABLE 21
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS

Q27 with Q31
Statistic
Spearman
Rank Corr.
McNemars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.1357

18.807

Sign

df

.022

.0428

ASE1

T-Value

.068

-1 .989

.034

-1.201

ASE1

T-Value

.068

-1 .399

.037

-.647

ASE1

T-Value

.063

-2.886

.032

-.712

10

-.043

Q28 with Q31
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr.

Value

.0952

McNemars
Test

9.690

Kappas
Reliability

-.024

Sign

df

.080

.3234

10

Q29 with Q31
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr.
McNemars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.1835

37.014

-.024

Sign

df

.004

.0001

10
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(see Tables 15 and 20).

However,

there is no significant

correlation between these two variables.

Even more

interesting is that there is no significant positive
correlation either.

McNemar's test of symmetry indicates

rejection of the null hypothesis that these executives are
consistent in their responses, and the Kappa value suggests
a very poor degree of multiple rate reliability.

A review

of the frequencies and standardized residuals in Tables 16
and 20 shows no particular patterns.
between questions 30 and 31

The chi-square test

(see Table 16)

also indicates

no significant differences between the responses on these
two items.

In summary these analyses suggest there is no

determinable link between the stability or turbulence of
the business environment and the types of plans this group
of executives will use because of that changing
environment.

The null hypothesis cannot be rejected; and,

therefore, both Armstrong and Kurke & Aldrich may have been
specious in their comments.

Since environmental change

does not suggest reliance on one planning method over
another, question 31

becomes simply a question of executive

preference for types of plans to use in decision making
irregardless of the business environment.

Therefore, as

one further check on inter-item reliability, question 31
compared to question 25

(see Table 23).

A review of the

Spearman rank order correlation suggests a highly

is

TABLE 22
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS

Q30 with Q31
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr,
McNemars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.0913

19.365

.034

Sign

df

.083

.0359

ASE1

T-Value

.068

-1.352

.037

.964

10

significant relationship at the
However,
chance,

,05

level of

significance.

the Kappa value notes poor agreement,

beyond

of multiple item per subject ratings reliability.

While the two variables are significantly related,

these

respondents did not necessarily respond the same way on
each which is

further substantiated by the McNemars test of

symmetry.

Hypothesis £4:
formal plans

The top executive's preference for

in making a corporate decision is

significantly related to the risk to the firm of a wrong
decision

(see Armstrong,

Armstrong

(1982)

1982).

suggests that if a particular

decision is extremely risky to the well-being of the firm,
the executive will prefer formal plans

in making that

decision rather than his/her own personal experience or gut
feelings

(please refer to Chapter III

for clarification of

the definitional differences between risk and importance as
used in this
37

study).

The survey instrument question number

specifically relates to this hypothesis.
A perusal of Table 24

finds a fairly normal

distribution of responses in each scale category.

The

standardized residuals offer no consistent pattern that
substantially deviates

from what is suggested by Armstrong.

Although the chi-square values are not large,
statistics indicate a significant difference

chi-square
(at the

.05

TABLE 23
LEVEL OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN QUESTIONS

Q25 with Q31
Statistic

Spearman
Rank Corr.
McNemars
Test
Kappas
Reliability

Value

.6441

20.616

-.007

Sign

df

.001

.01 45

ASE1

T-Value

.047

-13.264

.033

-.195

9
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level of

significance)

exists between both a random

distribution of expected values and a preset directional
distribution of expected values.
While 47.7% of the respondents have a preference for
formal plans,

nearly one-quarter of the respondents prefer

using either both types of plans or informal plans.
on the above analysis,

Based

the null hypothesis of no difference

must be rejected and a hypothesis of some preference for
plans accepted.

It appears

from a review of the frequency

distribution that Armstrong is,

in fact,

correct in his

supposition that executives prefer using formal plans to
make decisions that are risky to the firm.

However,

based

on a review of the standardized residuals and the chisquare values,

further empirical testing is needed to

clearly substantiate the directionality of that preference.

1 44

TABLE 24
QUESTIONS RELATED TO HYPOTHESIS

Q37: Which type of plans are most useful in making
extremely risky,

Scale

to the firm,

Observed
Frequency

strategic decisions?

Relative
Frequency (%)

Standardized
Residuals

1

53

22.4%

-3.2884

2

60

25.3

-1 .3164

3

59

24.9

+1 .6848

4

45

19.0

+4.3753

Informal = 5

16

6.8

+1 .2056

Formal

=

Total n = 237
Median
= 2.559
Mean
= 2.618
Chi-Square
Directed Chi-Square

=
.080
Standard Error
Standard Deviation = 1.223
28.180
36.531

df = 4
df = 4

Sign.
Sign.

=
=

. 000
. 000

♦The expected values are preset to the proportions of 5,
10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1)
respectively, as the theory suggests.
This Chi-square
indicates that these responses are substantially different
from theoretically expected.

Hypothesis £5:

The top executives of Canadian

corporations are significantly more likely to use formal
plans

in their corporate decision making than are top

executives of U.S.
and Lipset,

corporations

(Dickerson & Nadeau,

1985).

Dickerson and Nadeau
executives are more formal

(1978)

suggest that Canadian

in their corporate decision

making than are their colleagues in the U.S.
(1985)

1978

Malcolm

more recently suggests these differences are less

than in the past and that the Canadians are now much more
similar to their U.S.

colleagues

in their preference for

types of decision-making plans.
A comparison of the U.S.

and Canadian executives was

done to determine preference for types of plans and for
rational or intuitive personal
27

styles.

Tables

25,

26,

and

show the results of these comparisons on the issue of

preference for formal or informal plans.
A chi-square test of the differences was conducted for
questions

21,

25,

and 38.

The chi-square tests were

conducted without presetting expected values since they
were tests of direct relationships,
residuals
purposes.

however the reported

still require preset values for calculation
In addition,

a goodness of fit analysis between

the two groups on each variable was administered.
procedure

(the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)

This

looks at the

TABLE 25
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS

Q25;

(HYPOTHESIS 5)

In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do
you prefer?
Observed
Frequency

Relative
Frequency (%)
USA

Can

Standardized
Residuals
USA*

Can*

USA

Can

= 1

24

18

17.5%

18.0%

2

38

25

27.7

25.0

+2.025

-

.863

3

42

31

30.7

31 .0

+2.789

+

.566

4

29

15

21 .2

15.0

+ .306

+1.621

Informal= 5

4

10

2.9

10.0

-4.470

+2.270

Scale

Formal

U.S.

Canada

137
2.655
.093
2.642
1 .090

99
2.710
.122
2.737
1 .217

Statistics
n
Median
Std. Error
Mean
Std. Deviation =
—

Chi-Square
Kolmogorov- Smirnov Z

= 6. 267
= .544

-2.829

-.650

Sign.
df = 4
:2-tailed prob.

=
=

.1801
.928

♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1)
respectively.

TABLE 26
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS

Q21 :

(HYPOTHESIS 5)

I use informal plans more often than the company's
formal strategic plans in making my decisions.

Observed
Frequency
USA

Scale

Relative
Frequency (%)

Can

USA

Can

5.1%

1 .0%

Standardized
Residuals
♦USA

♦Can

Disagree = 1

7

1

2

31

33

22.6

33.0

.688

3

15

12

10.9

12.0

-2.369

-1.753

4

65

38

47.4

38.0

-h7.183

■1-8.931

= 5

1 3

10

9.5

10.0

-2.751

-l■2.270

Agree

U.S.

Canada

1 37
3.692
.097
3.351
1 .109

99
3.526
.112
3.245
1 .084

Statistics
=
n
Median
Std. Error
Mean
Std. Deviation =

Chi-Square
Kolmogorov--Smirnov Z

= 6.455
=
.627

-3.897

Sign.
df = 4
2-tailed' prob.

-5.717
-1-

=
=

.606

.5907
.826

♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "informal" (5) to "formal" (1)
respectively.

TABLE 27
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS

Q38:

(HYPOTHESIS 5)

I use the company's formal plans more often than
informal strategic plans in making my decisions.

Observed
Frequency
USA

Scale

Relative
Frequency (%)

Can

USA

Can

4.4%

8.0%

Disagree = 1

6

8

2

56

38

40.9

3

17

9

4

41

= 5

2

Agree

n
Median
Std. Error
Mean
Std. Deviation =
—

♦Can

-1-1 .342

38.0

10.507

+8.854

12.4

9.0

-1.987

-2.460

33

29.9

33.0

+2,598

+

3

1 .5

3.0

-4.852

-5.409

Sign.
df = 4
2-tailed. prob.

=
.591
= 1.000

Canada

137
2.482
.092
2.811
1 .015

100
2.487
.117
2.835
1.118

Chi-Square
Kolmogorov--Smirnov Z

♦USA

-4.088

U.S.

Statistics

Standardized
Residuals

= 2.807
=
.311

.547

♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "disagree" (1) to "agree" (1)
respectively.

equality (homogeneity)

of the frequency distributions and

is extremely sensitive to differences in median,
dispersion,
found at the
variables.

and skewness.

No significant differences are

.05 level of significance in any of these
A review of the frequencies and standardized

residuals for each of these variables again indicates no
meaningful patterns but does show noticable differences in
each response cell.
equal,

The U.S. expected values are preset at

reflecting a random response, while the Canadian

expected values are preset proportionately, reflecting the
theory that Canadian executives are more formal in their
decision-making.
A similar analysis of the Canadian - U.S. differences
in approaches to solving problems

(see Table 28)

finds no

substantial differences in either scrutiny of the observed
frequencies or the standardized residuals.

There appear to

be no substantial differences between U.S. and Canadian
executives in their general approaches to corporate problem
solving.
U.S.

Thus the null hypothesis of no difference between

and Canadian executives in their preferences for

formal or informal plans or approaches to corporate
decision making cannot be rejected.

TABLE 28
QUESTIONS FOR CANADIAN - U.S. COMPARISONS

Q1:

(HYPOTHESIS 5)

Would you describe your general approach to solving
corporate problems as more rational or intuitive?

Observed
Frequency
USA

Scale

Relative
Frequency (%)

Can

USA

Can

2.9%

5.1%
34.3

-1-4.891

-1-

38.0

31 .3

-1-4.700

-H2.517

26

19.7

26.3

-

-1-5.117

3

1 .0

3.0

5

2

53

34

38.7

3

52

31

4

27

Intuitive^ 5

1

—

U.S.

Canada

1 37
2.721
.070
2.766
.825

99
2.839
.097
2.879
.961

Chi-Square
Kolmogorov--Smirnov Z

♦Can

-5.037

4

n
Median
Std. Error
Mean
Std. Deviation

♦USA

-4.470

Rational = 1

Statistics

Standardized
Residuals

= 6 .267
=
.671

.076

-4.661

Sign.
df = 4
2-tailed prob.

.789

1

-

.877

= .180
= .758

♦The U.S. expected values are preset at equal proportions
in each cell while the Canadian expected values are preset
at 5, 10, 20, 30, 35 from "intuitive" (5) to "rational" (1)
respectively.

other Canadian - U.S. Comparisons of Interest

Two other comparisons useful in describing the
relationship between U.S. and Canadian executives are
executive age and years of formal education.

A Mann-

Whitney U test was conducted to determine if these two
groups are from the same population.
Table 7)

The results

(see

suggest some significant differences at the .05

level between the U.S. and Canadian executives on the
variable of age.

The U.S. executives tend to be slightly

older than their Canadian colleagues.

However, there

appears to be no significant difference between the two
groups'

years of formal education.

There also appears to

be no difference between the two countries on the issues of
environmental stability

(see Table 7).

Part III -- Verification of the Results

Non-respondents Versus Respondents

As noted in Chapter III,

there is always a concern

that those who respond to a mailed questionnaire are
substantially different from those who don't.

In an effort

to verify the similarities and differences between
respondents and non-respondents a comparison was conducted
between those who returned postcards indicating they had
completed and submitted their questionnaires and those who

had not returned such a postcard.

These two groups are

compared on the basis of country (see Table 29), number of
full-time employees, primary business sector in which the
firm conducts business, and the amount of gross yearly
sales during 1985

(see Table 30).

No significant

differences were noted between respondents and non¬
respondents except for the Standard Industrial Code (SIC)
sector where the lack of respondents in the financial
sector substantially alters the ability to discuss sector
to sector comparisons, as related to financial
institutions,

in this study.

Early versus Late Responses

Studies conducted by Fowler (1984)

imply that there is

a significant bias between early and late questionnaire
returns; therefore, the responses to this survey are
carefully coded so that comparisons of this nature can be
made.

Statistically significant differences between early

and late time frames are found in the initial pilot study:
the earlier respondents came from smaller firms.

However,

these tests were conducted using a very small number of
responses in each cell which can bias the results.

A final

analysis using the full compliment of responses is
presented in Table 31.

No significant differences are

TABLE 29
NON-RESPONDENT TO RESPONDENT DIFFERENCES*

U. S.A.
Observed
Freq.

Canada

Relative
Freq.

Observed
Freq.

Relative
Freq.

Responded

76

10.7%

278

39.0%

Non-Response

78

10.9

281

39.4

21 .6%

559

78.4%

154
n = 713
Chi-Square
Spearman Corr.

=
.007
= -.003

df
ASE1

= 1
=
.037

Sign.
=
.9333
T-Value = -.084

♦This analysis is based on postcards returned from
respondents (n=154) indicating they had mailed the
completed questionnaire.
The number of returned postcards
does not equal the number of returned questionnaires
(n=237).
Undeliverable mail, coded as returned by the post
office (see Table 5), is deleted from this analysis.
There
are no significant differences between
respondent/nonrespondents and the variable country.

TABLE 30
THE RESPONDENT / NON-RESPONDENT ISSUE

Response with number of full time employees:
Chi-Square
Spearman Corr.

=
=

.915
.024

df
ASE1

=2
= .037

Sign.
=
T-Value =

.6328
.651

Response with SIC sector:*
Chi-Square
Spearman Corr.

= 9.252
= -.058

df
ASE1

=2
= .039

Sign.
=
.0098
T-Value = -1.486

= 4
= .036

Sign.
=
.2008
T-Value = - 1.458

Response with gross sales:
Chi-Square
Spearman Corr.

= 5.978
=
.052

df
ASE1

♦There is a significant difference at the .05 level.
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TABLE 31
COMPARISON OF EARLY AND LATE RESPONDENTS*

U.S.A.
Frequencies

Canada
Frequencies

Pilot:
15

20

71

36

46

39

5

5

137

100

Initial Mailing:

Final Mailing:

Telephone Reminder:

Total n

Statistics:
Chi-Square
Spearman Rank Corr.

Scale:

(1)
(3)

= 7.137
=
.169

df = 3
ASE1 = .064

= Initial mailing
= Pilot mailing

(2)
(4)

Sign.
= .0677
T-Value = 2.642

= Final mailing
= Late reminders.

*No significant differences are found between "return
period" and any of the questions related to the five
hypotheses or to the variables corporate size, gross yearly
sales, or sic sector.
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found between U.S. and Canadian respondents and early or
late returns;
the

nor are there any significant differences at

.05 level of significance between early and late

respondents for the variables of corporate size, as
determined by number of full-time employees,

gross yearly

sales, and SIC business sector.

Confounding Variables

As discussed in numerous places throughout this
document,

previous organizational research has found that

the variables respondent age,

level of education, SIC

sector, and years in a position affect attempts to analyze
adequately executive decision making in business
organizations.

Relationships between some of these

variables and the two countries were explored earlier in
this document

(see Table 7); however,

the present intent is

to partial out the impact these variables may have on the
relationship between country and other variables of
interest.

Table 32 presents the results of a statistical

analysis of the effect these variables
education,

(age,

level of

SIC sector, and years in a position) have on the

comparison between Canadian and U.S. executives.
Concerning the executive's approach to decision making
less than twelve years of education and over twenty years
of time in the present position both have an impact at the

TABLE 32
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

Education:

Country with D-M Approach (question 1),
Years

Statistics

<12*

12-14

1 4-1 6

16-18

>18

Chi-Square
11
4
df
Probability
Spearman Corr
ASE1
T-Value
1

.318

2.003
2
.367
-.288
.242
-1 .157

2.117
3
.549
.077
.119
.651

2.745
3
.433
.113
.126
.894

1 .554
3
.670
-.057
.169
-.339

Education:

.023
.251
.175
.440

Country with personal preference in types of
plans

(question 25).
Years

Statistics

<12

Chi-Square
3.676
4
df
.452
Probability
Spearman Corr
.175
ASE1
.167
T-Value
1 .049

1 2-1 4

14-16

16-18

>18

2.472
4
.650
.288
.247
1 .121

1 .399
4
.844
-.023
.115
-.199

1 .441
4
.837
-.005
.134
-.039

1 .655
4
.799
-.044
.171
-.258

♦Indicates a significant relationship at the .05 level or
higher.

TABLE 32 Continued (page 2)
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

CEO Years in Present Position;

Country with D-M approach

(question 1).
Years

Statistics

<

3

Chi-Square
4.286
df
3
Probability
.232
Spearman Corr
.065
ASE1
.137
T-Value
.478

3-6

6-10

2.344
2
.310
.031
.201
.154

2.942
3
.401
-.179
.158
-1 .137

CEO Years in Present Position:

1 0-20

>20*

.323

15.602
3
.001
.694
.094
3.942

4
.988
.061
.117
.519

Country with personal

preferences in types of plans

(question 25).

Years

Statistics

<

3

Chi-Square
2.946
df
3
Probability
.400
Spearman Corr
.229
ASE1
.129
T-Value
1 .773

3-6

6-1 0

10-20

>20*

6.049
4
.196
.268
.187
1 .415

5.949
4
.203
-.047
.160
- .293

3.620
4
.460
-.045
.120
-.372

.703
4
.951
.027
.197
.139

♦Indicates a significant relationship at the .05 level or
higher.

TABLE 32 Continued (page 3)
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

CEO Age: Country with D-M approach (question 1).
Years
Statistics

<35

Chi-Square
1 .600
df
2
Probability
.449
Spearman Corr -.365
ASE1
.286
T-Value
-1 .225

35-45

45-55

2.494
4
.646
-.135
.149
-.904

2.853
4
.583
.104
.113
.914

55-65
4.465
3
.21 5
.004
.128
.027

>65
8.573
4
.073
.204
.204
.965

CEO Age: Country with personal preference in types of D-M
plans (question 25).
Years

Statistics

<35

Chi-Square
1 .600
df
2
.449
Probability
.122
Spearman Corr
.386
ASE1
T-Value
.316

35-45

45-55

1 .979
4
.740
.109
.149
.734

5.187
4
.269
.091
.113
.797

55-65
3.771
4
.438
-.032
.124
-.255

>65
3.747
4
.441
-.076
.137
-.552
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TABLE 32 Continued (page 4)
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDING VARIABLES

SIC: Country with D-M approach (question 1).

Statistics
Chi-Square
df
Probability
Spearman Corr
ASE1
T-Value

Industrial
4.851
4
.3030
.044
.107
.416

Financial
3.516
4
.4755
.185
.120
1 .539

Service
.691
3
.8753
-.036
.116
-.310

SIC: Country with personal preference :in types of
plans (question 25).

Statistics
Chi-Square
df
Probability
Spearman Corr
ASE1
T-Value

Industrial*
13.864
4
.0077
-.119
.108
-1 .106

Financial
7.181
4
.1266
.033
.119
.278

Service
3.456
4
.4846
.198
.112
1 .773

SIC: Country with business environment stability
(question 30) .

Statistics
Chi-Square
df
Probability
Spearman Corr
ASE1
T-Value

Industrial

Financial

4.839
4
.3042
.028
.107
.257

1 .332
4
.7216
-.127
.120
-1 .062

Service
3.671
4
.4523
-.199
.112
-1.770

♦indicates a significance relationship at the .05 level.

,05 level of significance.

Over twenty years of time in

the present position and a connection with the industrial
sector also impact the executive's preference for type of
plans at the ,05 level of significance.

When less than

twelve years of education is taken into account, Canadian
respondents have a wider range of responses on question 1,
while the U,S, respondents tend to fall into either number
line category 2 or 3,

When the respondent has been in

his/her position for over twenty years, the U,S, executive
tends to favor both rational and intuitive approaches on
question 1

and both informal and formal plans on question

25, while Canadian executives selections tend toward
intuitive approaches to decision making and toward informal
plans.

When the impact the industrial business sector has

on personal preference for types of plans is considered,
U,S, executives tend to prefer both formal and informal
plans, while Canadians in the industrial sector favor
formal plans.

In conclusion, educational level, years in

the present position, and SIC sector do appear to have a
moderate effect on the variables of interest in this study;
therefore, conclusions drawn must be carefully expressed so
as to note these disturbances adequately.

CHAPTER

V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Restatement of the Study Obj ectiyes

This empirical study examines the two areas of
planning and decision-making at the highest echelon of
business organizations.

It is both an exploratory endeavor

and a measurement investigation that hopes to provide
practical social and theoretical scientific significance.
The strategic management literature suggests that
corporate decision making is really a haphazard and
disjointed process totally separated from the insights an
executive might gain from using a formal planning system to
help make those decisions.

Much of this study is aimed at

determining the validity of that suggestion.
Other literature in the field of comparative
management suggests not only that U.S. business executives
are likely to make very intuitive informal corporate
decisions but also that their counterparts in Canada are
more structured and inflexible and, therefore, more likely
to use very formal systems in their decision making.

Since

these issues are closely related to the original intentions
of this project, a cross-cultural comparison was deemed a
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valuable practical extension of the theoretical objectives.
A review of previous research in this area reveals
several testable propositions related to the theories of
corporate planning and decision-making.

Since little

empirical research has been carried out,

a measurement

instrument was developed to explore these hypotheses.

The

TGsults ar© snlig’htGning’.

Major Findings

The results of this study do not support the theory
that business executives prefer making most major decisions
using intuition and gut feelings.

However,

the findings as

presented below are only generalizable to the sample in
this study and not to the wider population of chief
executive officers throughout the U.S.
the study limitations,

and Canada,

within

the findings indicate that both U.S.

and Canadian CEOs do prefer to use formal plans to make
extremely important corporate decisions.

These surveyed

executives prefer to use both formal and informal plans in
situations where they need to "buy time."

However,

further

research is needed to determine which of these two
directions is preferred,
about the issue of

therefore,

"buying time"

little can be said

in the decision making

process.
It appears from the results of this

study that there

is no solid

link between the turbulence of the environment

in which the firm operates and the executive decision
maker's preference for plans.

While it seems

logical that

there will be a definite connection between environment and
types of plans used in decision making,

none is found.

There does appear to be a link between the riskiness of the
decision to be made and a general executive's preference
for formal plans
Finally,
U.S.

in making that decision.

there is no significant difference between

and Canadian executives in their preference for either

formal or informal plans in making corporate decisions.
The only exceptions are the following:
in the industrial

Canadian executives

sector appear to prefer more formal plans

for general decision making than their U.S.

colleagues and

Canadian executives who have been in their top level
positions

longer than twenty years prefer informal plans in

decision making more than their U.S.

colleagues.

also of interest to note that the U.S.
be,

on average,

It is

executives tend to

four and one-half years older than the

Canadian executives.

A caveat concerning each of-the above

is that if the executive has been in his position over
twenty years,

has

less than twelve years of education,

is working in the industrial

or

sector these generalized

findings cannot be substantiated and further research is
necessary.

Implications and Conclusions

Benefits to the Field of Strategic Management

Management studies of business executives at the upper
echelons of corporations are limited in both scope and
number
Lorsch,

(see in particular Mintzberg,
1983;

1970;

and Clifford & Cavanagh,

Donaldson &

1985).

Most

research about corporate planning investigates the impact
on performance of formal planning processes.
investigates the usefulness of
corporate decision making.
is a formal

-

pursuing this

study was

study

formal plans as a tool in

Numerous studies suggest there

informal planning dichotomy,

carefully define both terms.

This

but none

One of the requirements for

the development of clear and

concise definitions which can then be reused in other
studies to broaden our knowledge of
dimensions.

informal planning

Some research attempts to present models which

will help the individual executive more clearly define the
decision-making framework appropriate to his/her
personality and style;

however,

these models avoid

specifying the value and place intuition has
framework.

This

in that

study provides clarification for use in

building future theoretical models that give credence to
the intuitive side of decision makers'

thought processes.

A new view of both formal and informal planning is

developed by linking these two tools to the overall CEO
decision making process.
The implication is not that substantial and exclusive
enlightenment
management,

is

thrust upon the field of

strategic

but rather that some vague but interconnected

concepts are initially explored and related to each other.
This addition to theoretical knowledge hopefully provides
both insight and stimulation for more questions.
example,

For

since these respondents do not have a distinct

preference for either formal or informal plans

in their

business environments and since the instability of the
environments

is not

significantly different for each of the

three designated SIC sectors,

is

it possible that,

in

today's world economy change is so prevalent and rapid that
any answer/style will do in the short term?
This

study also adds new information to the field of

Canadian - U.S.

management studies.

The findings here may

be preliminary to other studies describing how a world
market may spawn a new international personality in
business executives.

These findings thus

substantiate those of Malcolm

(1985)

further

when he suggests that

Canadian business managers have become less formal and more
flexible in recent decades and dispute the Lipset
descriptions of the traditional,
conservative Canadian executive.

plodding,

(1985)

and ultra
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Benefits to Corporate Executives

The implications for corporate executives are that the
executives who participated in this
plans

study do prefer formal

for making important and/or risky corporate

decisions.

However,

neither formal nor informal plans are

substantially preferred for making decisions
environments.
and U.S.

Of

in turbulent

further interest is that both Canadian

executives feel they primarily use a decision

making approach that borders on being more rational than
intuitive.

This point is especially interesting since the

literature related to the Canadian - U.S.
suggests that U.S.
makers when,

perspective

executives tend to be intuitive decision

in fact,

the respondents

in this

study are

much more aligned with the rational approach to decision
making.
Recent articles in the popular business press have
stated that businesses are moving away from formal planning
systems.

The results here suggest that while formal

planning systems may not provide documentable,
financial benefit to the firm,
very useful

the CEOs

added

find such systems

in making major corporate decisions.

This

insight may provide a new classification for the value of
formal planning in U.S.

and Canadian corporations.
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Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Several future areas of research may rise from the
following limitations of this study.
First,

questionnaire studies have inherent weaknesses.

The cost of trying to achieve error-free estimates is too
high for most research purposes,

including this one;

therefore the return rates are often too low to allow for
generalization from the information obtained.

The self-

selected portion of the sample that actually chooses to
return the questionnaire is particularly problematic.

The

resulting answers obtained could be minority views and
atypical of the whole population.

Much effort has gone

into reducing and/or identifying those atypical views in
this study; however,

the results can still not be

advertised as typical and unbiased responses representing
the population of U.S.
Second,

and Canadian business executives.

it is difficult to know,

especially with a new

measurement instrument, whether the respondents find
different meanings in the same question.

The extensive

inter-reliability program conducted throughout this study
has alleviated many of these concerns, but the problem
cannot be ignored.
Third, with a mailed survey it is difficult to
ascertain whether the responses are actually those of the

targeted individual or those of an assistant or other
corporate officer.

Over 80% of the respondents indicated

they were from the highest level of the corporation
including President, CEO, and/or Chairman.

The assumption

is that the objective of targeting top echelon executives
was substantially met.

However, this cannot be verified in

this study especially since the returns were totally
anonymous.
More in-depth interviews need to be made to verify the
findings further.

An expanded observational/interview

project would help link the executive preferences in
decision making, as obtained in this study, with the
executive's actual behavior in making day to day corporate
decisions.

This will be a costly and time consuming future

research project and its merits must, therefore, be
carefully weighed against the advantages of further
substantiating the findings presented herein.
A comparably low response rate was obtained from
Canadian financial sector institutions.

This may be due

primarily to the extensive governmental involvement in all
aspects of business financing in Canada and its relatively
haphazard involvement in such institutions in the U.S.

The

results obtained via this study, even if further
substantiated through field study interviews, may not be at
all typical of the Canadian financial sector.

Hypothesis §2 had to be abandoned due to the extreme
inconsistencies in respondent data.

It now appears that

information needs to be gathered concerning the value of
"buying time" as a corporate decision objective.

Perhaps

the unreliability of the data from the respondents in this
study was due to a lack of perceived value for such an
approach to decision making rather than due to indecision
on the respondent's part.

Perhaps these respondents feel

the term "buy time" connotes a negative approach to
decision making.

It is possible that,

in spite of

extensive prepilot testing of the instrument,

these

executives are not familiar with the terminology at all.

Future Research Needs

Further research concerning the business philosophies
of executives with limited formal education compared to
those with advanced education will be useful to the field.
It also will be interesting to validate the connection
between extensive time in position and the executive's
decision making style.
Milman (1986)

has concluded that Canadian executives

favor low risk decisions while their U.S.

counterparts

prefer taking more chances; yet, this study finds no
difference between the two.

Future research should be

conducted to further test these contentions.

As noted
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earlier,

the U.S. popular press has recently explored the

apparent demise of formal planning systems in major U.S.
corporations, while this study suggests that U.S. and
Canadian executives still see a valuable use for such
systems.

Further study is needed to help explain these

discrepancies.

This pool of research exposes a valuable

use for formal planning systems,

i.e., a primary decision

making tool for top level executives.

Further research

aimed at documenting exactly when, under what conditions,
and how often business executives turn to formal plans for
decision making advice will be immensely helpful in
determining the in house value of such systems.
Finally,

further research in describing and

identifying the functioning of the executive is a never
ending need.

As Lilienthal noted back in 1967, the

executive's job is the most demanding,
and yet subtle of all human endeavors.

comprehensive, broad
It behooves us to

understand those who do that work and how they successfully
accomplish their tasks so that future business leaders can
build on the knowledge of their predecessors and assure the
world community of a stable and efficient world economy.

the
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and the questionnaire
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AT AMHERST

Depariment of Management

School of Management
Amherst. MA 01003
(413) 549-4930

March 26,

1986

Dear
We are writing to ask for your assistance in a matter of importance to you and
other U.S. and Canadian corporate executives.
Some authors have suggested that Ray Kroc, David Mahoney and Lee lacocca have
been successful because they use hunches and intuition in making important cor¬
porate decisions.
Yet, Alfred Sloan, former CEO at General Motors Corporation,
has been described as anything but an intuitive decision maker.
Is there value
in making major corporate decisions through intuition and gut-feelings? What
part does a formal planning system play in these decision making episodes?
These questions and others are being explored through the enclosed survey.
We are asking a small, select number of U.S. and Canadian top executives of
major corporations to participate in this survey.
Your name is among those
selected for the study.
We would be most grateful if you would complete the
enclosed questionnaire.
Since we are using a small, scientifically-selected
sample, your responses are very important to the accuracy and reliability of the
survey.
It will take only a short time to complete the questionnaire and return
it in the enclosed reply envelope.
We want to assure you that all responses are totally anonymous.
They will be
used only in combination with the responses from your colleagues throughout the
U.S. and Canada.
Please return the completed questionnaire at your earliest convenience.
Also
enclosed is a response postcard.
Please mail this postcard at the same time you
complete and return the questionnaire so we may remove your name from our remin¬
der list and file your wishes concerning receiving a survey summary report
and/or a personal interview visit.
Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study.
Sincerely,

rKent D. Carter
Principal Investigator
Enclosures (2)
w4/6601

The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AT AMHERST

Decartment of Management

Scnooi of Management
Amnerst. MA 01003
(413) 549-4930

April 22,

1986

Dear
We recently sent you a survey questionnaire and asked your assis¬
tance in completing and returning it.
Apparently it got lost in
the mails as we have not, as yet, received it.
Would you please
take the time to fill out the enclosed questionnaire and postcard
and return it to us as soon as possible.
We realize this is inconvenient, but due to the limited selection
of executives participating in this study your individual response
is necessary to assure accuracy and reliability.
Again we apologize for this imposition and sincerely extend our
thanks for completing and mailing the enclosed documents.
Sincerely,

Kent D. Carter
Principal Investigator
W4/9655

The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

Dear Researcher:
I am sending this postcard at the same time that I am putting
*my completed questionnaire in the mail. Since my questionnaire
is completely anonymous this postcard will tell you that you need
not send me a further reminder to participate in your study.
Yes, I would like a copy of the study results.

□

Yes, I would be interested in participating in
the confirmatory interview phase of the study.

□

Name:
Firm:.
Street: .
City: .
State: . Zip Code:
Telephone: .

Dear Researcher:
I am sending this postcard at the same time that I am putting
my completed questionnaire in the mail. Since my questionnaire
is completely anonymous this postcard will tell you that you need
not send me a further reminder to participate in your study.
Yes, I would like a copy of the study results.

Q]

Yes, I would be interested in participating in
the confirmatory interview phase of the study.

□

Name:.
Firm:.
Address:.
City:.
Prov.:. Postal Code:.
Telephone:.

Date:

REQUEST FOE TOP EXECXTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
Some CEO’s from both the U. S. and Canada have reported
that the questionnaire they received last week has been mis¬
placed. If you want to be included in this study, but no longer
have a copy of the questionnaire, you can request another by
completing and mailing this card.
Name:.
Finn:
Address:.
City:.
Prov. Postal Code:
Telephone:.

Date:

REQUEST FOR TOP EXECUTIVE QLTOTIONNAIRE
Some CEO’s from both the U. S. and Canada have reported
that the questionnaire they received last week has been mis¬
placed. If you want to be included in this study, but no longer
have a copy of the questionnaire, you can request another by
completing and mailing this card.
Name: .
Firm: .
Street: .
City: .
State: .Zip Code: .
Telephone: .
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U.S. AND CANADIAN
TOP EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING
A Survey of CEO Preferences for Formal and Informal Decision-Making

The purpoee of this questionnaire is to improve our understanding of how top
corporate executives use and are influenced in their choice between formal and informal
plana in strategic decision-making. To ensure the accuracy and reliability of this survey,
this questionnaire should be completed by the top execmthre of the company.
Your
responses are and will remain completely anonymous.

For the purposes of this study the following operational definitions will be used:
*

Strategic is defined as that which is important to the survival of the firm as
determined by the top executive decision-maker in terms of actions taken,
resources committed, and/or precedents set.

*

Rational Decision-Making is defined as the logical, linear, analytical, scientific
process of making important choices in the presence of an organizational objective
with the intent of meeting that objective.

*

Intuitive Decision—Making is defined as a relational, unsystematic, subjective,'
perceptive process of m^ing important choices in the presence of an
organizational objective with the intent of meeting that objective.

*

Formal Planning is defined as any explicit process that is exemplified by the
expenditure of resources and the development of written documentation articulating
the outcome of current decisions (one year or more), the establishment of a
process(es) to guide and limit these future actions, the combining of the corporate
level plans into a unified whole, and the systems for monitoring the results.

*

Informal Planning is defined as any implicit process that is an unstructured,
undocumented, resource expending, and, yet, planned response to business related
problems, opportunities, or crises.
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Th« initial aaction of thia queationnairc provklea a
traoMwork for tht furvty. Reapooaaa to the queations
below will give a broad overview of you and your
company’a viewa conceminf the iaaues of tnformal and
formal plena and daemon-maJan§.

6 Compared to other similar organuatmoa how would
you deaenbe the speed with which top level deciaiona
are made in your organuation? (Pleaee circhi the
appropnate number)
Somewbal slower
than similar

About th*

0 rf%aiA4(io 00

1. Would you dencribe your general approach to aotving
corporate probleme ae more rational or intuitive?
(Pleaee drele the appropriate number)
Intuitivo Preblea
Solviaf (Selvi^
problem* iatuiuvely
then fiadiaf
data to juatify
the oelutioa.
Approprtat* (or
wlvinc ail pro¬
blem* Dot juM (om*.

Ratiaaal PreUea
Selviag (Sehriag
preWaaa wiiheul
cmetieaai iavohrtaant,
uaiac tcMatific
rntthada. A aathe—
matieai tohitioa
devoid of 'hofiaaa.*

1_2_3

otbsto

I_2

3

7. To what extent do you confer with other top
executivee in your organixation concerning strategic
corporate decieione? (Pleaee ckclc the appropnate
number)
To a
Great
Extent

To Some
Extent

To a Very
Little
Extent

To a
To No
Little
Extent
Extent
I_2_3_A_5

4_^6

2. Do you prefer to baee your decieione on detailed
informatton or broad general outlinee? (Pleaee deck
the appropriate number)
Subataatsal
Detail

Considerably faster
thsn similar
orfausation*

same s*

Both
Equally

Bmad General
Outliaea

8. Done your company develop formal plane? (Pleaee refer
to the definitione on page 1 then chock the
appropriate box)
Y» □

No □

Noia: If no pkaee proceed to queetion 16.

1_2_3_i_i
9.
3. When you aaek information on which to baee your
corporate decintoae, do you prefer formal or informal
meetinci?
Disn—ises with
all intsrted
orgaaiaadeeal
members at th*
same time

Oiscumioai
with one
orgaaiaatlenal
member at
a tima

I_2_3

4

&

4. Whafto if any, techniquen do you nee to hone your
informal dednion-making abUitlea?

6. Which do you believe in mom important in making
soccannfnl corporate decieione: experience and common
aenee or npecialised training and education? (Pinnae
dndn the a^ropriate number)
Bdecariee sad
—* Tiainiag
sr* meat lapartaat la *ucca»ful dirisise

1

Beth
sts
squally
impeetaat

Experience sad
Cemmea Senes
sr* meal imper—
tsnt la eucems
(ttl iicmiia

2_3_4^8

Pleaee indicate the time period covered by the formal
plane. (Pleaee check the appropriate box)

□
□
□
□
n

Leeo than 1 year
1 year to 3 yearn
3 yearn to 6 yearn
6 yearn to 7 yearn
7 yearn or more

many

10. How comprehenaiv* are th* formal plane developed by
your company? (Pleaat ekde the appropriate
number)
Vsry Cemprtbenmv*
(*.g.uB** eutaideta,
forme sd hoc
eommitteee. cenduct*
■welk-ereuad* iatemsl
sad sxterasl
eesicbes, iavetvsa
peoel* with divefss
bseKgiwuada, eoeeidets
es msay rsuim
•e peseible).

Vsry Nod—eemprsbeaerv*
(*.g. rdiet only ea
idea* o( ea* er
twe peeple,
truoestee eesrch
vis limitiag time
sad Dumbw e(
pcopi* iavehred,
coneidert few
poeeibl* esuees).

3

1_2

4_^5

11. How much corporate attention doee your formal
planning proceBi r*c*tv* at th* upper levels of th*
organisatioa? (Pleaee ekcl* th* appropriate number)
Little Auentiaa
ta formal
reuiiaan

Much Atteetlee
to formal
reutiaas.

1_ 2

3

4

6

12. How often nre your formal pinna reviewed?
ekcck the npproprinte box)
Monthly

I

I

Quarterly |

|

Binnnunlly |

|

Annually

Q

Other

Q

(Plenae

18. How comprehensive are your company’s tnformai
plans? (Please cbcle the appropriate number)

Sota: if other please describe. _

13. How often are your formal plane likely to be
changed? (pleiM check the appropriate box)
Continuously |

[

Weekly

[]

Monthly

□
□
□
□

Quarterly
Biannually
Annually
Other

V«ry Comprehensivi
(t.f.uses ouiaidcia,
forms ad hoc
eommittoos, conducts
*wslk-areuad* Internal
and cxtsmal
•carchw, iavolvw
people with dWersa
beckfTounds, eonaideis
es many causes
ts poadble).

Very Non-eomprehcDsive
(e.f. relies only on
ideas of one or
two people,
truncates eaarch
via limitinc ‘>>as
and nufflbw of
people involved,
con^dert few
poeMble causes).

1_2_3

4_^5

19. How much do you personally participate in developing
these informal plans? (Please ckcls the appropriate
number)
To a
Great
Bxtaal

Noia: if other please describe.

To Soas
Exteel

To a
UtUs
Extent

To a Very
Little
Extent

To No
Extent

I_2_3_4_6

14. Does your corporation have a department or office of
planning? (PIsm cheek the appropriate box)
Y« □

meetingi, social functions, one-on-one interactions,
etc.). Please list in rank order of prevalence of use.

No □

20. Informal plans are more often need for making final
decisions than are formal plans. (Please drels the
appropriate number)
Strongly
DIm^so

1

If yes, how many years has it been operational?

If no, was there previously such a dept, or office?

Dioagrso

Undoeidod

Agno

Strongly
Agroo

2_3_4_^6

21. I use informal plans more often than the company’s
formal strategic plans in making my decisions. (Please
circle the appropriate number)
Strongly
Dioogroo

Disagtoo

Undoeidod

Agroo

Strongly
Agroo

1_2_3_4_6
16. How much do you support the development of formal
plans for your company? (Please ebeb the
appropriate number)
To a
Great
Extent

To Some
Extent

To a
Littk
Extent

To a Very
Little
Extent

To No
Extent

I_2_3_4_^6
18. Does your company use ir^ormal planning? (Please
refer to the de^tions on page 1 and than chsck the
appropriate box)
Y« □

No □

17. How are are these company informal plans developed
or negotiated? (e.g. st^ conferences, committee

The purpoee of this section is to learn something abont
your opinioos and attitudes concerning the usee of both
ir^ormal and formal plans when used to make strategic
corporate decisions. Please cirele the number on the
number line below each question that best reflects your
beliefs concerning the statement.

22. When the problem being considered is believed to be
extremely important to the firm, on what type of
plans should the top executive rely in making the
final decision?
Formal
Plaes

Both
Equally

Informal
Plans

I_2_3_4_^6
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23. In mnkinf imporitni (u opposed to ordinnry or
routine) stratefk deciaione which type of pinna arc
moat used?

29. How much do external changes threaten your
organuatmn?

Formal
Plaaa

Very littU
threat to our
orfuiixacional
(urvival

Both
Equally

Informal
Plana

I_2_3_4_5
24. It is often usefol to make an initial decision based on
tnformal plans (in an effort to *buy time") and later
anaend or revolu that decision bas^ on formal
strategic plans.
Streasly
Diaa^ta

Oisaerta

Undteided

Afrta

Strenfly
AfTta

A
of

(Teat

deal

tnreat to

orfaaisationaJ
•urvivai

I_2

3_4

5

30. How would you describe your firms' business
environment at the present time?
certaia
MahU.alo«
to chanfa

both
certain and
uneenaia

urteertain
volatile, rapidly
chanfioe

1_2_3_4_S

1_2_3_4_^6
25. In making strategic decisions, which kind of plans do
you prefer?
Formal
Plans

Beth
Equally

Informal
Plaaa

1_2_3_4_6

31. Based on your response to questions 27-30 are you
mote likely to use informal or formal plans in inaking
important corporate decisiona?
Formal
PlaiM
1

2

Both
Equally
3

loformal
Plana
5

4

32. What do yon expect the average lift cycle of new
products or services in your business to be? (please
check the appropriau bm)
2d. It is oftea nssfal to make an initial dscision bissd on
formal plans (in an cflort to "buy time") and later
amend or revoke that decisioa based on informal
strategic pians.
Stroaghr
OiMgm

CXsigrai

Uadeddad

Agraa

Stronfly
Agraa

1_2_3_4_^5

Leas than 1 year
1 year to 3 ytan
3 yean to 5 yean
5 yean to 7 yean
7 yean or mors

□
□
□
□
Q

How many?

33. In what kind of industry or business is your
company?
The porpose of the following sectioa is to kam
something abont your opinions and attitudes concerning
the ones of both formal and informal plans in oncertain
and certain bnsineas environments. Please cktle the
number on the number line befow the question that best
reflects your beliefi concerning the statement.
27. How often must your organisation change its
marketing practices in order to keep up with your
competitors and the changing market place?
Rarely ehaafa
our markatiag
ptmcticas.

Fraeiiaatiy (aamior mare
oftaa) rhssfa
o«ir praeticaa.

1_2_3_4_5

28. How would you describe your organisations
product/service obsolescence rate?
V«y SWw
Rats of Chasfi
(#4. a bade
mstai Ska
cappar).

I_2_3

Vary Hish/
Fast Rata af
Ckasfa (#4.
hshlaa (DM tami-ceoduet«fe).

4_^5

34. What doss your company make or do?

The purpose of this section is to learn something about
your opinions and attitudes concerning the usee of both
informal and formal plans in making high risk strategic
decieione. Please circle the number on the number line
that beet reflects the extent to which you agree or
disagree with the statement.
35. Does your organisation seem to preftr low rink or
high tlih projecu?
A tcadsaey
tovwd low
risk projoew
(ehsaeos (or
normsl and
ctneis rasas
of retuca).

1_2_3

A toadasey
toward hi^
riak prajaeta
(ebaaeas for
high rasaa af
rasara).

4_^5
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36. Does your orgsoizstion seem to prefer incremental or
bold direct exploration of the business environment?

38. I use the company’s formal plans more often than
tn/ormal strategic plans in making my decisions.

A »lo«, timid,
incremental
exploration of
the environment

Strongly
D>*Mrte

A bold,
wide-ranging
exploration of
the environment

Disagree

Undecided

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1_2_3_4_6

1_2_3
37. Which type of plans are most useful in making
extremely risky (to the company) strategic decisions?
Formal
Plans

Both
Equally

39. Are you satisfied with the way major decisions are
made in your organization or would you like to
institute some major changes in that process?

Informal
Plans

Very satisfied
with our praMnt
decision-making
procMS.

1_2_3_4_5

Need major
changw in
our decision¬
making proea

1_2_3

Demographic Information
40. How many fall time employees does your company have?
41. How many years of formal education have you attained?

42. What degree or degrees have you received?

43. What is your major area of vocational or educational training?

44. What is your present position (title)?

_

45. How many years have you been in your present position?

46. What year did you begin working for this company?

47. What was your position when you first started working for this company?

43. With how many other companies have you held full time employment during your
working years? _

49. How many different positions (titles) have you held during your working years?

50. What is your present age?
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Thamk yom for your time and cooperation. We appreciate your aasietance in completing
this questionnaire. If you have any questions regarding the questionnaire, please contact
the principal investigator, Kent Carter, at the following address.
Department of Management
School of Management
The University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA.
01003
413-649-4030 ext. 318
To avoid receiving further survey reminders please fill out and mail the enclosed postcard
when yon mail the completed questionnaire.
If you are willing to participate in a follow-up personal interview and/or if you would
like to receive a copy of the study "results summary," please check the appropriate box
on the encloeed postcard before mailing it.
Cooiineats (please add any additional information you desire):
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